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ABSTRACT

J Haddadian, Afsaneh. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University,
2012. Social Movements’ Emergence and Form: The Green Movement in Iran.

Theories of social movements suggest that ‘objective’ changes in the structure of political
opportunities and their interaction with mobilizing and framing mechanisms render a
system vulnerable to mass protest. By examining the variables relevant to such
interaction, this study seeks to account for the emergence and form of the 2009 Green
Movement in Iran. This research uses the congruence method and process traces the
movement adherents’ activities, mainly their use of Information Communication
Technologies, and investigates the so-called opposition leaders’ activities and statements.
The study argues that in accounting for emergence and form of the Green Movement, we
need to attribute the central role to the bottom-up framing processes that gave value and
meaning to the movement’s goals and strategies. Political opportunity structures only
appear in terms of ‘perceptual’ rather than ‘objective’ changes in the structure of the
system. Further, the research investigates implications for other authoritarian settings
and, more generally, for theories of social movements.
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The study of social movements has proliferated since the political turbulence of
the 1960s and 1970s. This process began to develop dramatically with an increase in
European and American scholars’ contacts and collaborations in the field in the 1980s.
Their collaboration has resulted in exposure to different perspectives that have, according
to McAdam et al. (1996), undercut the theoretical provincialism characteristic of earlier
work. Facing cases from different national contexts has forced scholars to adopt a more
comparative perspective. More recently, the focus in the study of social movements has
shifted from solely structural, mobilization, or cultural explanations to a more
comparative perspective reflecting on all three dimensions having arisen from scholarly
works. Though best known for their emphasis on the political opportunity structures of
social movements, theorists such as Gamson (1992), Tarrow (1989), and Tilly (1978),
have also acknowledged the critical catalytic effect of new ideas as a spur to collective
action. McAdam’s (1982) discussion of the necessity for “cognitive liberation” as a
prerequisite for mobilization is an acknowledgement of the importance of ideas in the
political process tradition. These framing processes undermine the legitimacy of the
system or its perceived propensity to change.
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) point to a consensus that most political
movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the
established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. But these “political
opportunities,” drawn from rational choice theory, are but a prerequisite to action. In the
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absence of sufficient organization—whether formal or informal—such opportunities are
not likely to be seized. Finally mediating between the structural requirements of
opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and definitions—or frames—
shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement. The impetus to action, thus, is as
much a cultural construction as it is a function of structural vulnerability. Such change in
the structure of politics encourages mobilization not only through the “objective” effects
they have on power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further
undermine the legitimacy of the system. Expanding political opportunities then acquire
their causal force from the interaction of those structural and perceptual changes they set
in motion. A similar reciprocal dynamic defines the relationship between organization
and framing processes. Framing processes clearly encourage mobilization as people seek
to organize and act on their growing awareness of a system’s illegitimacy and
vulnerability. At the same time, the potential for the kind of system critical framing
processes is conditioned by the population’s access to various mobilizing structures.
Also, framing processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequences
under conditions of strong rather than weak organization. The absence of any real
mobilizing structure would likely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people
required to afford a basis for collective action.
In an effort to bring more analytical clarity to the concept, various authors sought
to specify what they see as relevant dimensions of political opportunities. Among those
who have offered such schema are Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rutch (1196),
and Tarrow (1994). McAdam synthesizes these perspectives and identifies four highly
consensual dimensions of a given system’s “structure of political opportunities”

	
  

2	
  

(McAdam, 1996, p.27). These are: first, the relative openness or closure of the
institutionalized political system; second, the stability of that broad set of alignments that
typically undergird a polity; third, the presence of elite allies; and fourth, the state’s
capacity and propensity for repression.
Although there is a good amount of scholarly work on the impacts of these three
factors on the emergence of various social movements in the European and American and
former Soviet states, there is little theoretical analysis of the structure of political
opportunities and their interactions with resource mobilization and framing processes in
authoritarian forms of government. The focus of this study is the causal factors that can
help us understand the emergence of a social movement in an authoritarian setting. One
of the most recent examples of such collective action is the 2009 Green Movement1 in
Iran. Identifying the movement’s emergence and form as the dependent variable, I will
attempt to test various hypotheses drawn from these three major theoretical frameworks
(structure of political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing processes) to
measure the impact of each on the emergence and form of the movement.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The 2009 protests over the disputed presidential election results in Iran reminded
many of the revolutionary course of 1979. Due to the novelty of the phenomenon there
are still few theoretical explanations for the emergence of the movement and the form it
has taken thus far. Also, there is little consensus among scholars on the relevance of
major social movements’ theories to the Green Movement and the central role of political

1
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opportunities. The case presents interesting implications for the study of social
movements and its most plausible theory to date; that is the interaction between political
opportunity structures, resource mobilization and framing processes.
Due to the absence of theoretical explanations and the uncertainty regarding the
outcome of the Green Movement, a puzzling research question arises: under what
conditions can we expect the emergence of a particular type of movement? (e.g.,
grassroots reform movement, civil rights movement, or revolution). This poses a subquestion: how do political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing
processes interact to create an environment for success or failure in a given
movement? McAdam argues that the important implication of the question is that the
various types of movements are simply different forms of collective action rather than
qualitatively different phenomena requiring distinct explanatory theories. Rather than
assuming difference, we need to treat movement type as variable and seek to account for
variation in type on the basis of particular combination of opportunities, mobilizing
structures, and collective action frames.
To answer these questions, I will conduct in depth analysis of four variables
impacting the emergence and development of the Green Movement in Iran from 2009 to
mid-2010. This study will draw upon the political process model—the structure of
political opportunities, mobilization structures, and framing processes—to identify what
factors may have contributed to the emergence of the Green Movement and the
implications of these factors on the form of the movement—bearing in mind that the
Green Movement is still a developing movement and may take various forms due to a
particular constellation of identified factors.
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Using a single case study research design, this research will employ congruence
method and process tracing to specifically explore the causal path between the dependent
and independent variables identified in this study, and the implications for theory
predictions in general. Three hypotheses drawn from the three theoretical frameworks
and the literature on social movements in general and Iran’s long history of collective
actions in particular, will be tested. This work seeks to identify the relevant variables and
causal mechanisms that contributed to the emergence and form of what some scholars
thus far, have identified as a non-violent civil rights movement in Iran.2 Also, the 1999
student protests in Iran will be considered as part of the context in what many scholars
have called the “cycle of protests.”
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on social movements is vast with scholars emphasizing at least one
dimension of collective action. Increasingly one finds social movement scholars
emphasizing the importance of three broad theoretical factors in analyzing the emergence
and development of movements/revolutions. These three factors are 1-the structure of
political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement, 2- the form of
organization (informal and formal) available to participants, and 3-the collective process
of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediates between opportunity
and action.
In this study these dynamics are referred to by their conventional shorthand
distinctions of political opportunities, mobilizing structure, and framing processes
(McAdam et al., 1996). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) are among the first to put
2
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political structure, resource mobilization, and framing in a comparative perspective.
These scholars emphasize the interacting dynamics among these factors in the emergence
(timing) and form of movements. They argue in favor of the political process proponents
and share the conviction that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion
by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive
to challenge. In their own words “these political opportunities are but a necessary
perquisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization—whether formal or
informal—such opportunities are not likely to be seized. Finally mediating between
structural requirements of opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and
definitions—or frames—shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement”
(McAdam et al., 1996, p.8). As stated earlier the focus of this study is on the emergence
and the form that movements take in the initial stages of collective action, thus I will
review the scholarly works on the dynamics of political process model—structure of
political opportunities, Mobilization dynamics, and framing—in emergence and form of
social movement.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
The first modern observer to draw an explicit linkage between states and social
movements was Alexis de Tocqueville (1955). He provided the first response as to why
states are so central a focus of the mobilization. Drawing from the French Revolution, he
argues that centralized states aggrandize themselves by weakening and co-opting the
intermediate corporate bodies in civil society. The result is that the stronger the state, the
weaker its encouragement of institutional participation and the greater the incentive to
confrontation and violence when collective action does break out.
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The term “structure of political opportunity” is first used by Peter Eisinger (1973)
to help account for variations in “riot-behavior” in forty-three American cities. Eisinger
found that “the incidence of protest is […] related to the nature of a city’s political
opportunity structure” which he defined as “the degree to which groups are likely to be
able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (1973, p.25).
According to McAdam (1996, p.23) this key premise informing the work of Lipsky
(1970) and Eisinger has been appropriated as the central tenet in a new “political process”
model of social movements. Since then the timing and emergence is largely viewed to be
dependent on the opportunities afforded to a particular movement’s adherents by the
shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power. McAdam
recognizes the dangers that widespread adoption of political opportunities potentially
carries. As Gamson and Meyer (1996) note “the concept of political opportunity structure
is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the
social movement—political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political
alliances and policy shifts, […] used to explain too much, it may ultimately explain
nothing at all” (p.275).
In an attempt to shed light on some of these problems stated by various authors3,
McAdam draws upon three conceptual problems: first, “political” versus other kinds of
“opportunities”; second, the dimensions that compose the “political opportunity
structure”; and third, the very different dependent variables to which the concept has been
applied. He argues that the kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are most
defensibly conceived of as political opportunity should not be confused with the
3
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collective processes by which these changed are interpreted and farmed. He also
acknowledges that while the two are closely related they are not the same; treating them
as separate preserves the definitional integrity of political opportunities.
Synthesizing various authors’ conceptions of relevant dimensions of “structure of
political opportunity”—Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al (1992), Tarrow (1994)—McAdam
offers four dimensions of political opportunity: first, the relative openness or closure of
institutionalized political system; second, the stability or instability of that broad set of
elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; third, the presence or absence of elite
allies; and fourth, the state’s capacity or propensity for repression. McAdam
acknowledges that the only nonconsensual dimension4 he has incorporated into the
definition is the ability of the state to repress opponents. Some scholars (e.g., dellaPorta,
1995) have speculated that state repression is really more an expression of general
receptivity or vulnerability of the political opportunity structure, rather than an
independent dimension of the same. McAdam casts doubts that state repression is merely
the result of interest groups within the polity. He draws historical references from the
1989 Chinese student movement and the 1979 revolution in Iran. Both had to some extent
the same political opportunities, but in the former communist party hard-liners were able
to repress the movement, whereas in 1979 the ruling elite was not able to do what the
Chinese hard-liners had done. This, McAdam argues shows the merit of considering state
repression as a dimension of political opportunity.
In specifying the relevant dependent variable, McAdam asserts that the concept of
political opportunity has been often used to explain the emergence (timing), and the
4
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development (the outcome), as well as the form that the movements take. Seeking to
understand the emergence of particular movements, the scholars of political process
sought to link the initial development of insurgency to “expansion in political
opportunities” beneficial to challenging groups (Costain, 1992; McAdam, 1982).
Also, as suggested earlier, movement form is another variable that owes, in part,
to the nature of the opportunities that set movements in motion. McAdam (1996) asserts
that “if we array movements along a continuum from the narrowest of institutionalized
reform effort on the one pole to revolutions on the other, we can, I think, discern a
general relationship between type of form of movement and changes in dimensions of
political opportunities” (p.29). He argues that, for example, an expansion of opportunities
for the opponents in the institutional or legal structure or the emergence of new allies
within a previously unresponsive political system set in motion the narrowest and most
institutionalized of reform movements. By narrow McAdam (1996) is referring primarily
to tactics one can expect such movements to employ, “to extent that the movement has
mobilized in response to specific changes in access rule, we can expect it to act primarily
to exploit that new crack in the system” (p.31). According to McAdam, as we move
toward the more radical or even revolutionary end of movement continuum, the other two
dimension of political opportunity come increasingly into play, a significant decrease in
either the will or the ability to repress and the development of significant divisions among
previously stable political elites, are related to a more non-institutionalized and
revolutionary forms of protest.
Finally, McAdam (1996) turns to the international context of political opportunities
as a dimension that influences the movements. He cites several works done on the
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international political pressures in expanding the opportunities for movements’ adherents
(Salama Layton, 1995; Wang, 1989; Marks and McAdam, 1993). Shifting international
conditions is a variable considered important in encouraging mobilization in domestic
arenas.
Zirakzadeh (1997) looks at Germany’s Green, Poland’s Solidarity, and Peru’s
Shining Path movements, in a comparative perspective. Citing works of other scholars
such as McAdam (1989), Migdal (1974), Powell (1971), Smith (1991), he asserts that
constitutions, national level policies, policy making processes, and inter-governmental
struggles over power profoundly influence both people’s decisions to participate and the
strategies and tactics that a movement adopts. Also, he asserts that some social problems
and political arrangements such as economic repression or intense electoral competition
may generate splits among government officials and may lead factions to seek allies
among groups of the non-wealthy.
Zirakzadeh (1997) argues that an alliance between a fledging movement and
governing faction might occur that temporarily protects the participants from state
harassment, and this may persuade more people to join the movement (p.14). Although
he is analyzing what most scholars call the “new social movements” mostly akin to
movements that occurred after the 1960s in Europe, his application of a political process
model as a way to account for various pathways of these three movements is
enlightening.
In an analysis of states and opportunities and the snow balling effects of
movements on one another, Tarrow (1996) points out that movements appear at the
subnational and subgroup level, they rise and fall and change their shapes rapidly during
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cycles of protest, and they are profoundly influenced by trends that transcend national
boundaries. According to him these three dimensions of movement dynamics: infranational variations, cycles of protest, and transnational collective action play a vital role
in shaping a movement. He asserts that in age of satellite communication, global
television, and fax machines, even movements that are independent of one another have
almost instant access to information about what other movements are doing. In the case
of democratization movements of 1989, we saw a transnational movement which
employed similar strategies and rhetoric and which the late- comers learned from their
predecessors (p.53).
Also defining the structure of political opportunity, Tarrow (1996) asserts that he
refers to “consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—signals to
social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal
resources to form social movements” (p.54). He makes it clear that his concept of
political opportunity not only emphasizes formal structures like state institutions, but the
conflict and alliance structures which provide resources and impose constraints external
to the group. Unlike money or power, this kind of opportunity opens windows that even
weak or disorganized challengers can take advantage of to organize against powerful
opponents. Conversely, as opportunities narrow, even the strong grow weak and
movements are forced to change their form of action and strategies.
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES
McCarthy (1996), in an effort to illuminate how mobilizing structural forms
emerge and evolve, how they are chosen, combined, and adopted by social movement
activists, and how they affect movements, asserts that political opportunity and strategic
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framing are particularly important in analyzing these processes. He acknowledges that
“by mobilizing structures,” he means those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective
action, which include particular “tactical repertoires,” “particular social movement
organizational” forms, and “modular social movement repertoires.” He also includes the
range of everyday life micro-mobilization structural social locations that are not aimed
primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these
include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and
elements of state structure itself (p.141).
By doing so McCarthy (1996) tries to systematically account for different
movement mobilizing structural configurations. He notes that a comparative analysis of
varying political opportunity structures and differential strategic framing approaches in
the dynamics of social movements across nations and time, demand to do so. Attempting
to map these structures in a society, he asserts that at the least formally organized end of
the map are “families” and “networks of friends” (p.142). It is upon these most basic
structures of everyday life that much local dissent is built. These structures are in line
with McAdam’s widely adopted phrase, “micro-mobilization contexts” that suggest a
wide variety of social sites within people’s daily rounds where informal ties between
people can serve as solidarity and communication facilitating structures when and if they
choose to engage into dissent together.
Tilly (1978) used the notion of “netness” to account for movement adherents by
the denseness of their social relations that are created by these many institutional ties.
Others have used notions such as “communities of memory” (networks of demobilized
activists) (Woliver, 1993), “subcultures of dissent” (Obserschall, 1996), and “protest
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infrastructure” (Gamson and Schmeidler, 1984), to account for the role of informal
structures of everyday life in mobilization.
According to McCarthy, closer to the more organized end of the continuum are
informal networks created primarily as mobilizing structures. Tilly (1978) recognizes
other sub-groups that “can also be the building blocks during protest campaigns.” These
classes of mobilizing structures are hybrids in that they are more organized, but they
operate within existing organizations/institutions; “prayer groups, caucuses, study groups,
sports teams, commissions,” (p.143) are examples of such groups. Social Movement
Organizations (SMOs) are the more organized form of these protest blocks and serve as
movements’ dedicated mobilizing structures. SMOs exhibit wide variations in
institutional forms. One is the “independent local,” volunteer based group emblematic of
our image of the “grassroots” group (Lofland, 1985), but many local groups are tied to
national structures—some federated into coalitions, many others branches of strong
national organization.
McCarthy (1996) categorizes the range of building blocks of mobilizing
structures primarily by their degree of organizational formalization and centralization as
well as their formal dedication to social changes goal. He argues that describing this
variation in extensive and systematic detail enables us to abstract its important
dimensions, in order to describe typical sub-movement, movement, movement industry,
and movement family, historical and national profiles of mobilizing structure (p.144). He
acknowledges that in any concrete social setting, a range of mobilizing structures are
more or less available to activists as they attempt to create new movements or nurture and
direct old ones. Activists must choose among their constituent elements and the choices
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they make have consequences for both the intensity and shape of collective mobilization
as well as in expanding or constraining the range of political outcomes it can provide.
McCarthy also discusses the interrelationship between political opportunities,
framing and the mobilizing structures. He asserts that more stable elements of political
opportunity are central in shaping the available range of mobilizing structure in the
longer run, and more volatile elements of political opportunity are important in
understanding the shorter run choices among those available structures that activists
make. Also, particular mobilizing structures (such as leadership style, availability of
resources, organization, networks of individuals/activists) will be more or less useful in
taking advantage of a particular political opportunity.
In an attempt to consider different aspects of political opportunities, various
authors have built upon the concept. Kriesi (1996) identifies a more stable element of
political opportunity structures as the “general political context” which incorporates the
strength of the state and its typical degree of its response to challengers. Rucht (1996)
employs the idea of “context structure” which conflates natural, social, and political
contexts, although he pays most attention to the political context. In doing so, he tries to
link resource mobilization approaches and political opportunity to assess the impact of
external opportunities on movement structures.
For the sake of clarity, Rucht specifies key categories. Social movements consist
of two kinds of components: first, networks of groups and organizations prepared to
mobilize for protest actions to promote or resist social change; and second, individuals
who attend protest activities or contribute resources without necessarily being attached to
movement groups or organizations. Mobilization is the process of creating movement
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structure and preparing and carrying out protest actions, which are visible movement
products addressed to actors and public outside the movement. Rucht (1996) asserts that
for large scale and sustained movement activities mobilization requires resources such as
people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technological tools to process and
distribute information and to influence people (p.186). By movement structure he refers
to the organizational bases and mechanisms serving to collect and use the movement’s
resources.
Movement structure can serve other purposes beyond mobilization, such as
disseminating information within the movement, forging a collective identity, or
satisfying the personal interests of the movement leaders. Rucht then distinguishes three
forms of movement structure: first, the Grassroots model, characterized by a relatively
loose, informal, and decentralized structure, emphasis on unruly, radical protest politics,
and a reliance on committed adherents; second, the interest group model, characterized
by an emphasis on influencing politics and a reliance of formal organization; and third,
the party oriented model, characterized by an emphasis on the electoral process, party
politics, and, reliance on formal organization.
Further Rucht asserts that in case of structural setting of a movement, the authors
in the volume edited by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald are looking for those
environmental elements that shape movements’ forms or activities. More concretely, the
authors are interested in those conditions external to a given movement which either
restrict or facilitate the building and maintenance of movement structure devoted to
conducting protest activities. What makes this context relevant to the movement is that it
involves resources and conditions beyond a movement’s control. The movement can
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realize its potential to be strong and successful to the extent it takes this context into
consideration and makes it resonant by structural attunement, strategic calculation, and
clever use of leverage points. This requires an identification and “exploitation” of
patterns that work in favor of the movement (e.g., dissatisfaction of the people with the
established elites) and the avoidance of that which could weaken it (e.g., loss of powerful
allies).
Building upon the role of mobilizing structures, Zirakzadeh (1997), emphasizes
the role of leadership in mobilizing resources and asserts that a movement for and by
discontent people only appears after alliances are forged between an aggrieved
constituency and a group or person who has the appropriate political experience, vision,
or resource to help that constituency. Emergence of a movement then requires an “issue
entrepreneur” who is able to attract resources. He also treats what many scholars call
Social Movement Organizations or SMOs (McAdam et al., 1996), as the “indigenouscommunity” approach. That is how local level social institutions, such as neighborhood
clubs, union clubs, and community churches, can provide organizational building blocks,
communication networks, and leadership skills for later social movements. He notes
“social movements thus arise naturally out of people’s daily, local, and largely apolitical
patterns of social interaction” (1997, p.14). Also regarding the political structure
surrounding movements, he acknowledges that constitutions, national level policies, and
policy making processes, and intergovernmental struggles over power profoundly
influence both people’s decisions to participate in a movement and the strategies and
tactics that a movement adopts. Zirakzadeh asserts:
according to almost all the newer generation of social movement theorists, a
leader of a fledging movement cannot create and control the movement simply by
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peddling exciting ideas about change or by vilifying a minority population. Before
and aspiring leader can hope to be influential, a broader constellation of political
circumstances and associational ties has to be in place (p.15).
FRAMING PROCESSES
Justifications for strategic choices are discussed in the context of definitions of
relative opportunity and these are recurrent sources of contention within movements.
Framing consensus, then, is variable between movements and typically a contentious
internal process, and the definition of opportunity is often at the center of what is most
contentious. This suggests that we need to focus on this process of defining opportunity
and its dynamics.
McAdam (2000), with the notion of “cognitive liberation,” has identified four
general types of “expanding cultural opportunities” that appear to increase the likelihood
of movement activity (p.254). These four are: first, the dramatization of a glaring
contradiction between a highly salient cultural value and conventional social practice.
Second, “suddenly imposed grievances”, the notion is first used by Walsh (1981). This
cognitive stimulus to framing processes describes those dramatic, highly publicized, and
generally unexpected events (i.e. human made disasters, court decisions, official
violence) that increase public awareness and opposition to previously accepted social
conditions. Third, dramatization of a system’s vulnerability or illegitimacy. And fourth,
the availability of what Snow and Benford (1988) term “master protest frames” within
which subsequent challengers can map their own grievances and demands.
According to McAdam (2000), movements tend to cluster in time and space
because they are not independent of each other. For example, he argues the rash of
student movements that flourished around the globe (in Spain, France, Germany, Mexico,
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Japan, Italy, and the United States) in 1968 were clearly attuned to and influenced by one
another, resulting in development and diffusion of a “student left master frame” (p.258).
By the same token, the success of Poland’s Solidarity in finally breaking the communist’s
party monopoly on power encouraged other Eastern European dissidents to adopt
prodemocracy frames in their own countries. The more general theoretical point is that
successful framing efforts are almost certainly influenced by other groups to re-interpret
their situations in light of the available master frame and to mobilize based on the new
understandings of themselves and the world around them. Thus, the presence of such a
frame constitutes yet another cultural or ideological resource that facilitates movement
emergence.
Mayer Zald (1996) sketches six topics in the interplay of movements, framing, and
larger society (p.261). First is the cultural construction of repertoires of contention and
frames. Second, since framing takes place on the context of larger societal processes, she
discusses the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical events in providing
opportunities for framing. Since frames are generated by a diverse set of actors in
relations to a variety of audiences inside and outside of the movement, she argues the
third topic for attention is framing as a strategic activity. The fourth topic for Zald is
competitive processes that represent the context in which frames are selected and come to
dominate. Since frames are contested, within the movement by leaders and cadre
debating alternative goals and visions for the movement, and externally by
countermovement actors, bystanders, and state officials who oppose the movement. Fifth,
frames are transmitted and reframed within the mass media. Finally, he argues we must
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understand how political opportunity and mobilization intersect to shape the outcomes of
framing competition (p.262).
Zald asserts that culture, ideology, and strategic framing are linked because they
are the topics that deal with the content and processes by which meaning is attached to
objects and actions. Culture, he argues, is the shared beliefs and understandings mediated
by and constituted by symbols and language of a group or society. Ideology is the set of
beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to
interpret the political world. Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations,
and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and
to suggest alternative modes of action.
The issue of how social movements innovate and change has been linked to
cultural analysis through the notions of repertoires of contention and cultural tool kits.
Although Tilly is largely considered structuralist, his notion of “repertoires of action”
(1978) recognized and gave legitimacy to the notion of innovation and learning of
repertoires of contention. More recently, Ann Swidler’s idea of “culture as tool kit” gives
a framework for thinking about institutional learning and the bricolage process by which
components of the cultural stock are assembled into specific models, or exemplars, of
socially defined behavior.
Focusing on the societal and media context of framing, and framing as a strategic
activity, Zald (1996) clarifies that social movements exist in a larger societal context.
They draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, or what is a violation
of what ought to be (p.266). Contemporary framing of injustice and of political goals
almost always draw upon the larger societal definitions of relationships, of rights, and of
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responsibilities to highlight what is wrong with the current social order, to suggest
directions for change. Similarly, movements draw on cultural stock on how to protest and
how to organize, “the templates of organization include skills and technologies of
communication, of fund-raising, of running an office, of recruiting members. Repertoires
of contention include bombing buildings, building barricades, organizing marches, nonviolent disruption, and the like”(Zald, 1996, p.267). Further, he acknowledges that social
movements, their leaders, and participants are differentially situated in social structure.
As such they draw upon the repertoires and frames available to and compatible with the
skills, orientations, and styles of groups that make them up.
Moreover, Tilly (2009) calls attention to cultural breaks and cultural contradictions
that lead to action and policy imperatives only as they are defined in an active process of
cultural and movement construction. Political and mobilization opportunities are often
created by cultural breaks and the surfacing of long dormant contradictions that reframe
grievances and injustice and the possibility of action. Cultural contradictions occur and
lead into mobilization when two or more cultural themes that are potentially
contradictory are brought into active contradiction by the force of events, or when the
realities of behavior are seen to be substantially different than the ideological
justifications for the movement.
Discussing the role of media in framing, Tilly (2009) acknowledges that these
interactions occur through various from of media—newspapers, books, pamphlets, radio,
and television. Also, movement activists may debate in coffeehouses, in meeting halls,
etc., but they have to change the ideas and mobilize bystander publics, many of whom
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may only know of the movement’s goals and visions only slightly, or through the media
controlled by the dominant system/state.
Zirakzadeh (1997) also refers to framing processes as “fashioning identities” in the
study of social movements. He cites many scholars who believe that ‘culture,’ broadly
understood as how we interpret social arrangements, how we see our places within these
arrangements, and how we see our immediate opportunities, powers, and limitations,
profoundly informs and shapes our political actions. Accordingly patterns of social and
personal cognition and patterns of political action should not be treated as unrelated
phenomena. He recognizes two sub-sets of identity-formation theory as “popular culture”
approach and “autonomous movement-culture” approach. The former holds that rich
cultural currents are being constantly developed by ordinary people in restaurants, cafes,
streets, and the cyber space, where people speak about their sufferings and ways how to
approach them.
As an example, African-Americans who joined the Communist Party in 1930s
accepted many Leninist ideas but also held onto notions of Black Nationalism that Party
leaders strongly opposed. The result was a complex process of factional conflict,
ideological compromise, and cultural cross-pollination within the party. According to
this approach, to understand a social movement one should pay attention to first, the
specific local popular culture context; second, cultural diversity; and third, the inevitable
consequent ideological conflict within the movement.
The autonomous movement approach holds that the social movement themselves
are climates, environments, in which new subversive ideas are invented and nurtured.
This identity formation process also questions the legitimacy of the power holders in
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many ways, despite elites’ efforts to influence the thinking of non-elites, the latter
repeatedly question the elite’s definition of reality in the daily expressions of popular
culture and within organized social movements. Social movements thus should be
understood as manifestations of ongoing cultural struggle between the haves and the have
nots, over how to understand and whether to tolerate current inequalities. Thus
movement’s goals, priorities, and tactics can be identified once we see through its
participants’ lenses.
Anthoney Oberschall (1993) in his evaluation of opportunities and framing in the
Eastern Europe revolts of 1989, asserts that in analyzing movements four dimensions can
be usefully distinguished: first, discontents and grievances; second, ideas and believes
about justice and injustice, right and wrong, and more comprehensive ideologies through
which discontents and issues are framed, and institutions and leaders evaluated and
criticized; third, the capacity to act collectively or mobilization of a challenger; and
fourth, political opportunity.
Oberschall considers lack of state legitimacy and ineffectiveness as an
opportunity for opponents. Since it is ineffective, it cannot expect compliance based on
expediency or interest, or only from a limited number of incumbents and privileged
clients. Bereft of legitimacy, the regime must then survive on fear and the threat of force.
This perceived lack of legitimacy is framed by “ideas and beliefs about right and wrong,
justice and injustice, and more systematic ideologies composed of cognitive images and
moral evaluations, with which people interpret and frame their discontents, evaluate their
circumstances, define public issues, and demand public action” (Oberschall, 1993, p.97).
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Framing and interpretation thus are social processes for articulating a variety of private
beliefs and preferences into shared meanings and values for joint action.
Also, acknowledging that the suddenness of 1989 opposition movements
precludes the organizational resources stressed by Zald and McCarthy (1987), Oberschall
asserts block recruitment of viable communities and associations does not operate when
there are no blocks to recruit. The theoretical issue is how spontaneous mass
demonstrations developed and how dissidents joined them to form an opposition
movement. When leaders and SMOs emerge on the back of mass demonstrations, the
accent shifts from SMOs to the diffusion of a protest culture and a collective action
repertoire (Tilly, 1978), from organization variables to loosely structured collective
action, shared symbols and collective identity.
Finally, Elena Zdravomylsova (1996), in analyzing opportunities and framing in
Russia’s transitions to democracy, shows how political opportunities, expanding and
shifting their locus in the course of the political cycle, encouraged different preferences in
framing and corresponding symbolism of democratic social movements. She believes
reciprocal the social movement’s framing influenced the expansion of political
opportunities. She distinguishes two types of social movement organizations in the
process—radical and moderate—and argues that the disruptive tactics of radical SMOs
were useful in beginning a protest cycle, but that was not efficient for action
mobilization. On the other hand, she asserts that symbolic framing of reformist SMOs
was appropriate to electoral mobilization at the peak of the protest cycle, and thus aided
the democratic success in 1990 elections.
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IRAN: THE CONTEXT: 1999 STUDENT PROTESTS
Tarrow (1996), points out that movements appear at the subnational and subgroup
level, they rise and fall and change their shapes rapidly during cycles of protest, and they
are profoundly influenced by trends that transcend national boundaries. In this study the
1999 student protests will be considered as the context and a part of a cycle of protest to
demand civil rights and liberties prior to the emergence of the Green Movement, as
students and youth are a major part of the Iranian population and a great degree of their
demands correlates with those of union workers and women’s rights activists. Thus some
literature on the phenomenon will be reviewed here. Also the Iranian diaspora has been
active during the height of the 2009 protests to disseminate information and gather
international support for the demonstrators.
Many scholars discussing the 1999 student protests trace the root causes of this
collective action to gain civil rights back to the early days of the 1979 revolution. The
causes for this activism to gain civil rights discussed by scholars are: the age factor, a
political cultural transformation, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the influence of
religious intellectuals, the influence of “print-media”, and the role of technologies.
The fact that two-thirds of Iran’s population is now under 30 is discussed by many
scholars. Mashayekhi (2001) asserts “young people, particularly in the third world, have
been most sensitive and emotional about, social, political, and economic issues” (p.290).
Further, Afshari and Graham (2007), point to the fact that many of the Iranians were not
even born during the Revolution, and thus “the under-30 generation knows current
Supreme Leader’s autocracy better than his predecessor Khomeini’s revolutionary zeal”
(p.89).

	
  

24	
  

Mashayekhi (2001) argues for a new “political subculture” of the student
movement in Iran and asserts “this political cultural transformation is rooted in a myriad
of social, economic, generational, political, intellectual and global developments” (301).
He discusses “the failure of Islamic utopianism,” in the sense that until 1980s students
themselves were among the most dedicated and ideologically connected to the Islamic
Revolution’s values and ideology and thus the failures of the system in the first decade
were blamed on the subversive role of “imperialism” or the “imposed war” with Iraq or
so on. When the war ended, Mashayekhi argues, “a chain of eye-opening events began to
disillusion this idealistic and dedicated generation of students” (p.302). Boroumand
(2007), also points to events such as: the defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, the removal of
Ayatollah Montazeri from his position, and a series of financial scandals and corruptions
on the part of the regime’s leading officials. The result, as Afshari and Graham (2007),
and Jahanbegloo (2000) assert, is the emergence of a “non-ideological” (p.136)
generation. Mashayekhi calls this shift the “de-ideologization” process among
revolutionary students.
Another factor contributing to this political activism against the Islamic Republic
values and policies discussed by the scholars is the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both
Mashayekhi and Boroumand (2007), argue that the demise of the Soviet Union and the
defeat of the Marxist Left in the early years of the revolution weakened the ‘ideological
and intellectual influences of Marxism and Socialism as political and economic
alternative for students,’ and has weakened the veterans’ beliefs in revolutionary
orthodoxy. Thus by the mid-1990s, revolutionary political Islam and socialist ideals were

	
  

25	
  

losing and liberal-nationalist discourse and democratic practices were gaining
momentum.
Many authors discuss the influence of religious intellectuals on the student
movements. Bayat (2007), asserts that the “post-Islamism” in Iran today has had
influence on three main areas: the redevelopment of the Tehran municipality and its
socio-spatial rationale; the Alternative “Thought Movement” led by Soroush; and Islamic
feminism. Many authors like Mashayekhi have mentioned the modernist and democratic
readings of Islam by Islamic thinkers such as Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, ziba-Kalam and
others, and the enthusiasm which the students showed for these interpretations. Afshari
and Graham (2007) assert that “the youth have forged a way to reconcile modernity and
their changing cultural preferences with the traditionalist interpretation of Shi’ite Islam
espoused by the state” (p.83).
The contribution of the press or the “print-media” as Mashayekhi puts it, is another
factor influencing the student movement. Mahdi (1999) also stresses the role of these
journals. With television and radio in the state’s domination, media outlets including the
monthly “Kiyan” and Tabarzadi’s the “Student Massage” were tools to promote concepts
such as democracy and human rights.
The role of technologies is also discussed. Afshari and Graham (2009,) argue that
new technologies ease cultural change. By the same token, Mashayekhi points out that
“not all the sources of the emerging democratic political subculture are domestic”
(p.303). He asserts that “cultural globalization and information technology” (p.304) have
its impacts on civil society, especially among the youth and students.
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Finally, Mashayekhi presents a structural analysis of social movements, discussing
the linkage between “the structure of political opportunities” (p.299) and movement
activities. The first structural feature of the Islamic Republic benefiting the political
student activism is the nature of its pluralistic factional politics. The second one is the
fact that the Islamic Republic is a young system; Mashayekhi argues that many of the
leading officials still had linkages to the middle and pre-revolutionary intellectual class or
the Office for Consolidating Unity (OSU), Iranian student’s largest pro-reform
organization, and these linkages gave the students the power of mobilization.
THE GREEN MOVEMENT
Ramin Jahanbegloo5 describes the Green Movement as a transitional tool for
Iranian society that has led to the country's civic maturity. He argues that a “moral
capital,” which guaranties consistency of the protest through varying tactics has
flourished among Iranian citizens. Jahanbegloo asserts that the movement has two
principle characteristics in terms of its image: first, it is a ‘truth-seeking’ movement; and
second, it is ‘non-violent.’ The non-violent strategy, he argues, would be able to pave the
way for future democracy in the country. The refusal to engage in “retribution in kind” in
terms of violence, has called into question the legitimacy of the very essence of violence;
people want to break out of the vicious cycle of violence, he asserts. He also points that
the civil society is not expressing its demands in an ideological fashion, but is pursuing
its goals in the shape of a civil movement, and through civil protest methods. For
Jahanbegloo, the most vital condition for the movement to be successful is that it would
not turn onto an ideological path and stay non-violent.
5

	
  Boghrati,	
  N.	
  (2010,	
  May).	
  Jahanbegloo	
  on	
  the	
  Green	
  Movement	
  in	
  Iran.	
  Worldpress.	
  Retrieved	
  from	
  :	
  
http://worldpress.org/Mideast/3540.cfm	
  	
  

	
  

27	
  

Drawn from the literature, the dynamics of political opportunity structure, resource
mobilization, and strategic farming in the emergence and form 2009 Green Movement,
are thus summarized in the Political Processes Dynamics figure below:
1.1. Political Process Dynamics Figure
Structure of political
opportunity

Mobilizing structures

Strategic framing

Openness/closure of the
system

Leaders

Ideologies/identities
(perceived legitimacy)

Cracks among elites

Grassroots/SMOs

Elite allies

Information Technologies

The degree of repression

Informal social movement
networks

Information Technologies
Informal social movement
networks

International
pressure/Isolation
State’s centralization of
economic power
Failed reforms

PROCEDURE
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The Green Movement’s emergence and its short-term viability and form6 is the
dependent variable. What factors cause the timing (emergence) of a particular type of
social movement in an authoritarian setting? How do political opportunity structures,
mobilizing structures, and framing processes interact to create an environment for shortterm viability (form) in a given movement? To answer these questions, I will conduct an
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in depth analysis on the emergence and development of the Green Movement in Iran
from 2009 until mid-2010, which marked the end of the large-scale demonstrations.
Building on Zirakzadeh’s (1997) definition, this study defines social movements
as non-elite attempts to transform societies radically through complex mixtures of
socially disruptive and non-disruptive tactics. Also borrowing from McAdam, McCarthy,
and Zald (1996), political opportunities are defined in terms of changes in the
institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system.
The interactions of the four consensus dimensions of political opportunities identified by
McAdam with other variables will be examined by this study. By mobilizing structure,
this study refers to those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which
people mobilize and engage in collective action. In terms of framing processes, the aim of
this study is “strategic framing,” that is conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to
fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and
motivate collective action. This study will explore the framing of the ideas about right or
wrong to nourish the movement’s goals as adherents weigh their options for taking action
in the movement. As this study seeks to establish the interaction between political
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, the strategic framing sheds
lights at various dimensions of this interaction.
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables analyzed in this study are: (1) the availability of
aggravated classes (grassroots identities and informal social movement networks), (2) the
use of information communication technologies, (3) Ideologies (including the perceived
illegitimacy or legitimacy), and (4) the availability of a strong leadership.
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There is much evidence of a non-ideological, post-charismatic, and
technologically advanced social movement culture in Iran today. As many consider the
current movement a “non-ideological” or “post-ideological” movement, breaking away
from the communist, leftist, or Islamic ideologies of 1970s, I will look at this new
identity to attempt to determine its nature and its goals and ideas of its constituencies in
the strategic framing of their protests. This study will analyze the implications of such
factors in terms of its short-term success and the interaction of structure, organization,
and framing.
As mentioned earlier in the literature review, many factors have impacted the
emergence, form, and short-term viability of the Green Movement (these factors are
summarized in figure 1.1.). However, recognizing the scope of this study, there are
limitations in performing sufficient analysis on all of these factors. This study will focus
on four of these factors as independent variables, leaving room for the discussion of other
variables in interaction with these four. The four independent variables chosen have
directly impacted the movement and reflect on current trends in political and social lives
of Iranians and not the structure of the Islamic Republic’s system. The interaction
between the structure and the mobilizing and framing processes will then be discussed in
the fourth chapter in this study.
HYPOTHESES
Identifying these variables I hypothesize that:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Political opportunity structures are constantly impacted by mobilizing
structures and framing processes. In the case of the Green Movement’s emergence and
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form, the central role should be given to the framing processes rather than the political
opportunity structures.
To operationalize the implications for framing processes, I will investigate sociocultural structures and identities of the grassroots with a focus on Internet users and
bloggers. The historical context of Internet usage will also be examined. Framing
strategic options is important in a social movement context, and this framing happens by
way of conversations, discussion, deliberation, and decision-making on the part of
movement adherents.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The grassroots identities and the use of information communication
technologies have had a positive impact on the emergence and form of the 2009 Green
Movement;
To investigate this impact, I will analyze the new uses of technology during the
movement, including the many crafty ways in which citizen activists worked to
circumvent the limits on social media posed by the regime.
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the absence of a strong charismatic leadership within the Green
Movement, there have been limitations on the short-term success of this movement.
To determine the impact of the leadership in the Green Movement, this study will
look at the so-called opposition faces, Mousavi and Karoubi, their political orientations,
goals, and statements during the 2009 protests. This study will also analyze the cracks
among elites, which indicate a shift in the structure of political opportunities by
contracting the opposition leader’s views to those of more reformist, conservative, and
hardline persuasions during the protests. These individuals mainly include Iran’s former
reformist president, Mohammad Khatami; Iran’s former president and current chairman
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of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; Iran’s current president,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
METHODOLOGY
Examining one social movement in Iran, in a disciplined configurative case study,
this work will utilize a longitudinal study, over the course of the movement to observe
changes in the variables: I use the congruence method and process tracing to begin to
explain the emergence and form of the movement. The political process theory; that is the
interaction of political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and framing
processes, is considered as the theoretical framework of this thesis. George and Bennett
(2005) state “congruity” is an important general standard for congruence tests; that is
“similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized caused and observed
effects” (183), in comparison with theory predictions. The dependent variable thus will
be investigated both in terms of its causal relationship with the independent variables and
its congruity with theory’s predictions.
In order to establish the causal path, I will conduct in process tracing. According
to George and Bennett (2005), “the process tracing method attempts to identify the
intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (p.206).
Thus the within-case study would be enough for examining the hypothesis and for theory
testing. A disciplined configurative case study can contribute to theory testing “because
it can impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not, and it can serve
heuristic purposes by highlighting the need for new theory in neglected areas”(George
and Bennett, 2005, p.75).
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The case of the Green Movement in Iran presents a critical and a thorough test for
the purpose of this study and may contribute to theory development. The images of
thousands of protesters in 2009 reminded many of the revolutionary course of 1979. The
question arises about under what conditions has it turned to, as many scholars now
discuss it, a non-violent, civil rights movement? In the era of information technologies
and globalization, are current theories of social movement sufficient to explain the
emergence and form of this movement? According to McAdam (1996) the various types
of movement are simply different forms of collective action rather than qualitatively
different phenomena requiring distinct explanatory theories. The dependent variable in
this study is the emergence and form that the Green Movement has taken thus far.
Using political process theory (the interaction between structure of political
opportunity, resource mobilization theory, and framing processes), this study will seek to
account for variations in the independent variables to determine whether or not we can
establish causal mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. This thesis will analyze
participation of movement adherents through process tracing with an eye on how the
participants used and took advantage of the Information Communication Technologies
(ICTs) in organizing and framing their collective action. Also, in the third chapter, the
degree to which participants appear to respond to the so called leaders’ demands and the
degree to which leaders are influenced by the movement’s demands are going to be
analyzed through process tracing.
The study will seek to examine whether we need afford the central role to the
framing processes rather than the structure of political opportunities in order to account
for the emergence and form of the Green Movement. Studying this case will also shed
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some light on demands of Iranian people and the path towards democratization in Iran,
and may contribute to theory development and possible future policy formation.
I will test the four independent variables to examine whether they can account and
explain for the dependent variable. Using general process tracing to account for causal
chains along with the congruence method, I will work to ensure that the within-case study
suffices for examining the dependent variable. This is important because the Green
Movement is a relatively new phenomenon and needs to be examined separate from older
versions of social movements in order to establish its identity. The interaction between
the three approaches (political opportunities structure, resource mobilization, and framing
processes) will be considered constant in this study to avoid issues of spuriousness,
causal priority, and causal depth in judging the strength of inferences made on the basis
of congruence tests.
The data for this study will mainly be collected from statements and sources on the
Internet, such as opposition websites, international news agencies, social media websites,
and blogs of the opposition activists during the protests. As many of these web pages and
some of the Iranian scholars and opposition activist’s commentaries on the 2009 protests
are in Farsi, the author’s translation will be added to this research wherever these works
are cited. Also, some Twitter feeds and Facebook and Youtube updates during the
protests, as well as Short message Service (SMS) messages will be used to indicate the
extensive use of ICTs during the collective action. The so-called leaders’ statements and
presidential campaign debates on state media before the elections will also be analyzed.
The Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies

	
  

34	
  

website7 will also be assessed to reveal the extent to which people are connected and use
the internet and mobile phone services in Iran.
Some of the Farsi websites and blogs include: Advarnews, Kaleme (“word”),
Jonbeshe Rahe Sabz (Jaras) (“the movement of green path”), Jomhourikhahi
(“republicanism”), Balatarin (the hottest link), Roozonline, BBC Persian, VOA Persian,
Deutsche Welle Persian, Radiofarda, the Green Movement’s of Iran Video Blog,
Tahavole Sabz (“the green change”), Green Correspondents, Shahrvand-khabarnegre
Sabz (“green citizen-journalists”), Nedaye Sabze Azadi (“green voice for freedom”), ZanNevesht (“woman-writings”), Tan-Nevesht (“body-writings”).8
The literature on social movements identifies interacting patterns of structures,
resources and values and meanings. Having identified the most relevant factors of each of
these categories to the Green Movement in this chapter, this research will conduct in
depth analysis on four of the independent variables that mainly pertain to cultural and
framing processes. Chapter Two will investigate the Green Movement adherents’
identities with an eye on their use of ICTs. Chapter Three explores the statements and
activities of the Green Movement well-known figures during the height of the protests. In
Chapter four, I will try to investigate the interaction between the structure, mobilization,
and framing as these processes constantly interact. Due to the novelty of this
phenomenon there is little access to archival works. The scholarly works on 1999 student
protests will also be examined in order to establish a historical causal mechanism for
variables examined.

7
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CHAPTER II:
GRASSROOTS’ IDENTITIES AND USE OF INFORMATION
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION
In order to comprehensively understand a social movement we need to understand
the social structures that inform its actions at both national and international levels. It is
also wise to look at the protest through socio-historical lenses, in terms of ongoing
changes in the economic, social, and cultural fields. If social structures and cultural
frames are, as Calhoun states, inseparable, it seems that it supports a crossover between
structure and agency.
Most of the decisions in life are made by using the available information. The
role of the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) thus becomes particularly
important. Most of the scholarship on the role of ICTs in the organizing and framing of
social movements is on open and in many cases western democracies, in which the role
played by the traditional mass media (i.e., television, radio, newspapers) and the new
media have both influenced the emergence and form of a particular social movement. In
the case of the Green Movement and in closed authoritarian states, with limited access to
the traditional media, the role of the new media and especially the Internet becomes more
important. This chapter on the cultural structure of the grassroots and their informal
social networks will examine the impact of the Internet in the emergence, organization,
and development of the Green Movement as many journalists and individuals turned to
the Internet as means to make their voices heard. This type of activity made bottom-up
communication possible, which was started long before the Green Movement emerged.
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With a focus on the Internet use and the Iranian Blogistan, this chapter will first
establish the cultural context in which the Green Movement emerged. Second, I will
process trace the ICTs use during the 2009 presidential election campaign and the Green
Movement to figure out whether there are any congruities with this thesis’ hypotheses on
the emergence and form of the Green Movement, and in framing a collective identity
among the protesters. Then, I will discuss the implications of the ICTs use for the Green
Movement in particular, and social movements in general. A brief literature on how
collective identities are formed in situations such as social movements where high
emotions are involved is first necessary.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORIES
Two dominant theoretical perspectives explain the framing of a collective
identity: the relative deprivation theory, and social identity theory (Zomeren, 2009).
Relative deprivation theory (RDT), posits that only when individuals perceive their
situation as relatively deprived will they experience anger and resentment, and seek to
improve their situation. This requires at least two conditions for individuals to engage in
a collective action. First, the deprivation must be perceived as group based. A second
insight from RDT suggests that individuals do not simply perceive social injustice or
inequality, but are often emotionally aroused by it too. This idea has paved the way for
applications of group-based emotion to the study of collective action. For instance,
feelings of group based anger and resentment motivate individuals’ willingness to engage
in collective action.
Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) proposes that
individuals’ perceptions of socio-structural characteristics influence their identification
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with the group, which predicts the likelihood of their participation in collective actions.
First, group members should perceive the boundary between their (low-status) group and
the comparison (high-status) group to be impermeable, such that they cannot join the
high-status group and improve their individual position. This is parallel with RDT’s
distinction between group and individual deprivation. Second, the group’s low-status
position should be perceived as illegitimate or undeserved. This means that people should
be able to imagine alternatives to the status quo (Tajfel, 1978). Third, the inequality
should be perceived as unstable, reflecting a sense of agency that the social structure can
be changed. In this way, individuals’ group-based perceptions of, and emotional
responses to, inequality and injustice have been identified as important predictors of their
willingness to engage in collective action. This aspect, as well as participation in a
collective action, promote a sense of psychological empowerment among group
members.
Others have argued, however, that perceptions of, and even emotions based in,
relative deprivation and illegitimacy may not be enough to predict actual collective action
behavior. Building on SIT, they propose that a strongly developed and politicized sense
of identification with a social movement is the best predictor of such behavior (Simon
and Klandermans, 2001). Some authors have taken this argument even further to contend
that people primarily identify with social groups for the purpose of mobilizing for
collective action and social change. Thus, another important factor motivating collective
action is individuals’ politicized identification with their group. Other scholars have
argued that not only in-group perceptions and emotions matter, but also individuals tend
to engage in cost-benefit calculation to determine whether they have the proper resources
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to mobilize for collective action (McCarthy, McAdam, Zald, 1996). The implication of
such theories and how the ICTs have enforced types of emotional collective identity
framings will be discussed in the third part of this chapter.
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT: BOTTOM-UP INTERNET USE AND
BLOGGING
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In 1998, when the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami was elected president
with a landslide victory, Internet use was limited to those with computer engineering
skills and the knowledge of a second language. Farsi content on the web was limited, and
only a few governmental organizations and newspapers shared a portion of their
information on the Internet. After almost eight years of Khatami’s presidency the number
of Internet users in 2005 surpassed 4.5 million.9 Almost all the governmental and nongovernmental institutions and newspapers had their own websites. The news content
published in the newspapers became accessible on the Internet and many governmental or
non-governmental news agencies began to disseminate the latest news on the web.
Individuals also began to write weblogs. University students were the originators of
blogging in Iran in 2001 (Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010).
By the end of Khatami’s first term presidency of four years, the reformist
newspapers were banned and many closed. With Internet use becoming more widespread,
reformists began to use it as a means to publish the news, debate issues, and critique the
regime. Development of different news networks on the web which had the same content
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as the banned newspapers and opposition news websites based outside of Iran, caused the
state to limit and control access to these websites. Later individual weblogs added to the
challenge, with the state unable to control all of them. These websites and blogs
surpassed the regime’s control over news dissemination and began to debate and
challenge the state’s policies by establishing channels to make different voices heard.
This was the first time since the establishment of the Islamic Republic that a
majority of grassroots and not the elites could debate, criticize, and disseminate the
information on state policies and actions. In response, the regime started banning and
filtering some of these websites viewed as contradictory to Islamic values (especially any
deemed political). Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) warned
Internet provider companies to obtain legal licensing. With the government having the
Internet service providers’ (ISPs) property rights under its control, Internet providers
were obliged to prevent the spread of non-Islamic, political, and ‘un-lawful parties’ on
the web. Thus, observing Internet content was defined as one of the Supreme Council of
Cultural Revolution’s responsibilities, and filtering websites and un-lawful content
became government’s responsibility. The Supreme Council announced that it was
protecting Islamic and national values by observing Internet content and banning and
filtering websites. In the last months of Khatami’s presidency, these acts proved to be
controversial among many union organizations and individuals. But Khatami defended
the supreme council’s decision and declared that the council is trying to defend the
national culture and values by doing so.10
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The case was the same for cell phone users and services such as Short Message
Service (SMS) and Multi-Media Messaging Service (MMS). As mobile telephony swept
across Iran, people found many intriguing uses for them. Iranians use SMS daily to send
out jokes (political or not) as well as organizational and informational messages. In April
2007, Iran’s telecommunication ministry announced that it would start filtering ‘immoral’
video and audio messages sent via mobile phones. The ministry was instructed by the
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution to buy the equipment needed to prevent any
misuse of MMS.11 Yet in the autumn of 2008, one could travel underground, open up a
Bluetooth and receive a welter of explicit adult or even political material and jokes on a
mobile phone.
Censorship and control in the late Khatami presidency and Ahmadinejad’s first
term, drove many people, including publishers, writers, journalists, and ordinary readers
to the Internet to find and to provide information, and to debate and make space for
expression. The journalist union came under severe attack in June 2008 when, as part of
the general incursion on civil liberties and social movement activities, the Iranian
government threatened to dissolve the their association12 and tried to remove the
association’s executive committee to replace them with conservative journalists. Some
created web based publications or collectives of writers who behaved much like a
pressroom, and yet others clustered in halghe (circles) of individual bloggers. Sreberny
and Khiabany note that these individuals are most often unpaid, often anonymous, and
self-organizing, and that these types of publications rapidly replaced the banned titles of
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formal journalism. In this dynamic, many journalists became bloggers, and other bloggers
have become journalists, especially outside Iran. Many of the once active bloggers from
inside Iran are now employed by Persian news services outside Iran, or write in wellknown international journals.
Control produces resistance. To surpass the regime’s control over the Internet (the
news content and the blogs) many have turned to hacking and filter-shekan (anti-proxy)
(Sreberny and Khiabany, 82). Many users of the Internet in Iran use these anti-proxies or
literally filter-breakers to go around government control. Many individuals as well as the
Persian language websites such as BBC Persian and VOA Persian, based outside of Iran
are actively involved in creating new anti-proxies and sending them out to Iran. People
discuss uses and different versions of these anti-proxies on different websites such as
Balatarin (the hottest link), a website that ranks the most popular link of the day for
Iranians.
By 2008 more sophisticated tools were available, produced by university
graduates inside Iran. There were programs for Firefox that enabled users to circumvent
the filter that blocked access to Flicker, the photo sharing website. Another extension
turned Firefox itself into a proxy that bypassed censorship on popular Web 2.0 websites
such as Youtube, Flicker, Myspace, and many others that were barred in Iran. Within less
than one hour of the BBC World Service website being blocked in January 2006, one was
offered ways into the site by people, and not all young, eager to be helpful (Sreberny and
Khiabany, 2010). Such techniques have been the terrain of fairly sophisticated net users;
in the summer of 2009 they were even more widely circulated and publicized, with
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numerous Youtube videos and Facebook and Twitter posts explaining how to circumvent
net censorship and how to become a citizen journalist.
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
Hamid Dabashi (2010) argues “cyberspace has expanded the cosmopolitan
worldliness of Iranian culture, further intensifying its multiple contentiousness as a
guarantor of resistance to any mode of governmentality that comes its face” (p.120). But
as Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) indicate, not all the sites or blogs in the blogosphere
engage with politics, rather they share the view with Dabashi that even “the most
mundane of issues in the Islamic Republic comes to have a gendered and political twist”
(p.129). In the blogosphere, a wide range of organizations and individuals are debating
the most significant and the most mundane of topics that are related to gendered relations
and state policies that affect Iranian women. Central to Dabashi’s argument of the
formation of this social phenomenon, for example, has been the rise of what bloggers call
tan-neveshteha (“body-writings”), a sustained and proactive flow of prose that young
women bloggers, in particular, have been writing about their own bodily (erotic)
experiences. Related to these tan-neveshteha has been del-neveshteha (“heart-writings”),
writing about one’s love and affection, again practiced mostly by young women.
Attempts to ‘Islamicise’ Iranian society after the 1979 revolution have been met
with many obstacles. The rapid modernization of Iran, the increase in urbanization,
literacy, and access to education, the connectivity as well as the inherent contradictions in
the Iranian state policies, which from one side encourages women to participate in the
public sphere and from the other deprives them of their many basic rights, have led to a
wider participation of women in the public sphere and new forms of politics. The very
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‘traditionalist’ women who were assigned to implement and safeguard the state policies
in Iran (one good example of them is Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard) have also begun
to challenge the discriminatory policies of the state and conservative readings of Islam.
Dabashi believes that in the course of the Green Movement we have seen the
“retrieval” of Iranian cosmopolitanism, which has been the essence of the 1979
revolution hijacked by a few Islamic fanatics who have tried to silence it for more than
three decades. He takes the Iranian, Islamic, and Christian calendars that are relevant in
everyday lives of Iranians as an indication of this cosmopolitanism. Pointing to the 1979
course of revolutionary events, he argues the Islamic rituals of 1978 were the most
influential determinants of the success of the revolution in overthrowing the Pahlavi
regime. More than 17 million people marched the streets of the capital Tehran in Ashura
(one of the most important dates in the Shi’it and Islamic calendar) to demand the
departure of the Shah. He points to the fact that in the aftermath of the Green Movement
people have used the Persian New Year festivities as a tool to insist on their Iranian
identity; one thing that could be seen on the weblogs of the Green Movement activists
which are full of nationalist discussions. The creative combination of these planes offers
opportunities to “play with and subvert the stratagems that a garrison state may wish to
deploy.” Islam according to Dabashi is “integral” to this cosmopolitanism but not
“definitive” of it—as it is “secularism.” He argues that the “multiple consciousness,”
imbedded in this use of three calendars is the space where the creative subject could
always find room for “political defiance, social maneuverability, and national identity”
(p.206).
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The signs of this culture, for Dabashi, are prose and poetry; the love letters of two
women activists to their husbands who have been imprisoned in the aftermath of the
Green Movement, expressed both as a personal affection and the demonstration of a
social phenomena. And beyond poetry the signs are clear in the popular music scene with
women pop singers publicly expressing their affection for a male object of desire. He
argues that the defiant prose of the bloggers (young women in particular) has been chiefly
responsible for this public and open expression of love. In Iran according to Dabashi
(2010) “things have moved beyond the false and falsifying binary of modernity/tradition”
(p.203). Against the gain of the militant Islamism he argues, the body has not become
political. The love letters of wives of the imprisoned opposition figures and journalists,
are an indication of a healthy retrieval of the social body that has naturally grown in the
body politic of a nation, “the public fusion of the political and the erotic is the defining
moment of this resurgent social body as it retrieves and defines its emancipated
cosmopolitan disposition” (p.188). A culture all but destroyed by the Islamic Republic.
For him, the Green Movement marks the return of such culture.
This cosmopolitanism, according to Bayat (2009), refers to both a social condition
and an ethical project. The former signifies certain objective processes, such as
globalization, migration, and traveling that compel people of diverse communal, national,
or radical affiliations to associate, work, and live together. These processes lead to
diminishing cultural homogeneity in favor of diversity, variety, and plurality of cultures,
religions, and lifestyles.
Cosmopolitanism also has ethical and normative dimensions; it is a project with
humanistic objectives (Bayat, 2009). In this sense, cosmopolitanism is deployed to
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challenge the language of separation and antagonism, and to confront cultural superiority
and ethnocentrism. It further stands opposed to communalism, where the inward-looking
and close-knit ethnic or religious collectives espouse narrow, exclusive, and selfish
interests. Cosmopolitanism of this sort also overrides the “multiculturalist” paradigm.
Because although multiculturalism calls for equal coexistence of different cultures within
a national society, it is still preoccupied with cultural boundaries and outlook that departs
from a cosmopolitan world where intense interaction, mixing, and sharing tend to blur
communal boundaries, generating hybrid and “impure” cultural practices.
Another example of such social phenomena, which has intensified during thirty
years of the Islamic Republic’s project of ‘Islamicising’ Iran, is a politically satiric TV
show on Voice of America’s (VOA) Persian channel. Hosted by two young Iranian expatriots, blending Iran’s traditional music with the western style music, and comparing
Iran’s politics to the democratic states and making fun of it, it starts with these opening
phrases in satire: “a TV show from the children of the revolution, who are now
considered the mercenaries of the US in order to spread arrogance in our Islamic
country.” Their Facebook page receives more than 30,000,000 hits every month.13 One of
their fans on Facebook lost his life on the streets of Tehran during the recent Green
Movement protests in support of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.
Other voices actively blogging on the blogosphere include leftists, unionists, and
students. It is worth noting that more than 40 million of Iranians, about 70 percent of the
population, are under the age of 30, while nearly 50 percent are under 20. The student
uprising in the summer of 1999 demonstrated the importance of this young generation of
13
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students. In analysis of 1999 student uprisings Mahdi (1999), suggests that the absence of
anti-imperialism and anti-American sentiments was matched by the absence of reference
to socialism, Marxism, and capitalism. However in recent years the students, at least
sections of them, have been radicalized. The failure of the reform movement to achieve
any key aims such as the rule of law, accountability, and more social openness, the
election of Ahmadinejad and his radical rhetoric and practices, and the changing
environment in the region (the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and threat of a military
attack on Iran) have produced a different kind of response. According to Mahdi the
student movement in Iran cannot and should not be generalized.
The Diaspora has also been active in the blogosphere, as many second and third
generations of Iranians are now living outside Iran and have children. The blogs have
been a good tool of connecting these individuals to inside Iran and widening their circles
of friends in social media networks.
Blogging as an activity plays powerfully on the cusp of the public-private: private
matters are turned public; public affairs are translated and coded for private,
known readers. Circles are built up of other bloggers, commentary upon
commentary, because bloggers are amongst each others, most faithful readers and
so new friendships are formed (Srenebry and Khiabany, 2010, p.160).
Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) also argue that if journalism is about articulating
social and political issues, about investigation and analysis, then “the Iranian blogosphere
functions as a powerful alternative, free at the point of consumption and relatively free at
the point of production-if the mighty hand of the state can be avoided.” Given this
background the explosion of journalism and photojournalism during the election process
of June 2009 and after can be seen as no surprise. “Here was a cadre of talented,
frustrated professionals and non-professionals prevented from doing their job and having
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a voice. Little wonder that so many people had so much to say in 2009” (p.126). Noting
this social phenomena and its diverse and vast demonstrations on the Internet, especially
the social media and the blogs, Sreberny and Khiabany note there is no surprise that these
individuals seeing themselves unable to change the course by casting their votes, “felt
frustrated in the election of 2009 and produced such an instant social movement. It had
been brewing for years” (p.129).
THE STATE CATCHING UP WITH GRASSROOTS’ INTERNET USE
The widespread use of Internet and high levels of connectivity in Iran have
convinced some elements of the regime and clerics that they have to catch up with the
latest technologies in order to reach out to the public. The Internet was used in 2005
election campaigns as well (Sreberny, Khiabany, 2010, p.141). With all candidates
having their own websites/blogs, and many religious institutions and agencies had
deemed it necessary to establish an on-line presence. The difference, however, was that
the debate and the consensus framing on many informal social networks and blogs and
among individuals was not to participate in the elections. The failed promises of Khatami
in the eight years of his presidency and the absence of any strong candidate who would
bring a change in state policies had convinced many to boycott the election in order to not
give the regime the legitimacy it needed.
In addition to the blogging activities of the inner circle of the state closely
associated with the veleyat-e-faghih (“the rule of the jurist”)—a reference to Iran’s
supreme leader—there are many religious intellectuals who, while still committed to an
Iranian state, have in recent years distanced themselves from its theological structure.
Many of these were part of the reformist camp that came to force during Khatami’s two
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terms as president (1997-2001 and 2001-2005). One of these figures is Mohammad Ali
Abtahi, one of Iran’s six vice presidents during Khatami’s presidency, who launched his
blog in September 2003, which became an instant hit. He announced his opening of a
blog as “I am here as well!” Shortlisted for Deutsche Welle International Weblog award
in 2006, his blogs consisted of daily articles and diaries, extensive archives, and articles
about him in other media. He wrote commentary in Persian and English on cultural and
social issues and regularly criticized any crack down on weblogs and the Internet. As one
of the chief advisors to one of the election candidates and later the opposition figure,
Mehdi Karoubi, Abtahi was arrested on June 2009 during the aftermath of the
presidential election, appeared in a show trial, and was sentenced to six years in prison.14
SUMMER OF 2009 AND THE ELECTIONS
THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
A look at Blogistan in both 2005 and 2009 presidential elections makes it clear
that the consensus languages among bloggers in these two presidential elections were
completely different. In 2005, it was the first time that Farsi language weblogs had a
chance to debate the presidential candidates and challenge other activists’ opinion. In an
analysis of Persian Blogistan in the weeks leading to the 2005 presidential elections, BBC
Persian’s website reported that from the first day of the election campaign many
influential figures in Blogistan were speaking of boycotting the elections. These
individuals are disappointed with Khatami’s eight years of reform government that has
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brought no real change in the Islamic Republic’s system and has not been able to fulfill
its promises of a more open society and or even create jobs and control inflation.15
The reasoning of those who have decided to boycott the elections in 2005 was that
the president does not have any operative authority in Iran and the other vertical
institutions make it a weak authority. Others did not want to give the Islamic Republic the
legitimacy it needs in the international arena by taking part in the elections. One of the
most famous figures boycotting the 2005 elections was Akbar Ganji (an insider and later
a political prisoner of the Islamic Republic), whose decision on not taking part in the
2005 presidential elections influenced many on Blogistan. Also, more than 550 elites and
political figures boycotted the elections (even before the Guardian Council rejected the
competency of many individuals to announce their candidacy) because of the monopoly
of power, and the fact that they could not see any hopes of the situation getting better by
participating in the elections.
There were, however, voices that were skeptical of boycotting the elections in
2005. One of the most prominent figures was Abtahi, who writes,
no analyst is hopeful of a sudden regime change in Iran, with its vast oil resources
and powerful army. We have a duty in this situation to think about the youth of
Iran and those who don’t want to leave the country and have very fragile
situation. Boycotting the elections, and the victory of one of the hardliner
candidates will have a direct impact on the youth’s everyday lives. They won’t be
able to walk in the streets the way they want, write weblogs, and not go to jail for
that.16
In 2009, however, the situation was different. The state, having controlled most
media and power resources, adopted a strategy to allow the opposition to organize its
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campaigns freely. The strategy purported to motivate people to vote in the election. For
the first time since the 1979 revolution, there were heated TV debates on the State-owned
TV channels between the presidential candidates.17 This was an exceptional opportunity
given to the political reformists and probably the only time available to broadcast their
messages in public without censorship. The reformists’ pre-election campaigns drew
unexpected support, as they allowed hope for change. Mass rallies supporting the
opposition occurred nationwide throughout the campaign period.
During the 2009 presidential elections, the Blogistan was buzzing with invitations,
writings, and hope to go out and vote to change the course that Ahmadinejad had
followed during his first four years of presidency. Ahmadinejad’s government policies
(both domestic and international) in his first four years as president, which had further
isolated Iran, had a strong impact on people’s decision to go out and vote. Almost all the
weblogs were trying to encourage Iranians to vote; few were arguing in favor of a
boycott.
In an interview with the BBC Persian website, Dariush Malakoot, the author of
the weblog Malakoot, notes that every blogger has a circle of friends, fans, and family
who are the ones influenced indirectly by the weblogs contents. This means that the
bloggers can transfer the debates and information sharing going on the blogs to their
family and friends and indirectly influence them.18 Akbar Montajebi, who writes a blog
with the same name, argued that one of the main characteristics of the 2009 elections is
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the leading argument on the blogs that encourages everyone to take part in the elections.
In this regard one could read in the blog named Zan-Nevesht (“woman-writings”),
which way that I look, I can see that in the current situation I am in the margins’
of today’s society. For being a woman, and a liberal. And I don’t have any hope
that this situation changes anytime soon. I will vote in the elections, so that I can
claim my marginalized right, and to make my voice heard to an extent and be
active.19
Also, in the debates about whether to vote or not, in the Blogistan many believed that
boycotting the elections would benefit Ahmadinejad and the hardliners camp. This was
coupled with the belief among the youth that if there is going to be a change in their lives,
it is going to happen by participating in the elections.
There were debates between the supporters, and even the advisors and
representatives of each of the four candidates in the Blogistan. Once there was a televised
debate between two candidates, the wave of critiques and supports from their opponents
and supporters filled the blogs. Besides, the flow of comments under each post and the
controversies over one paragraph written in a blog show the public’s enthusiasm and
conviction to take part in the debate.
In this intense political debate over the elections on the Internet and the virtual
world, the publication of a photo showing Mousavi and his wife hand in hand in public
after leaving a campaign lecture, buzzed the Blogistan and the Internet.20 What was new
about this photo was the merging of private space to public space—what has been
controlled and almost forbidden for years in Iran’s media. It may be because of this
change and difference that many believed Mousavi’s conduct in the campaign was
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thoughtful and goal oriented, in a way to invoke public enthusiasm for the elections. Even
if such conduct was just a campaign gesture, its importance in the Islamic Republic
cannot be refuted. The flow of comments and reaction to this picture, in the context of
Islamic Republic’s control over citizen’s private lives, show that every non-political act
can become political and cause controversy in Iran today.
State control over people’s everyday lives, from sports to arts, has made the public
look at everything in terms of state policies that restrict their lives. This has resulted in
interpreting and relating any simple private or individual conduct to the political
framework reigning on the country. In these circumstances, the conduct of the youth or
even the way they dress becomes a political act, even if such goal may have never
crossed a youth’s mind. A simple picture of a candidate and his wife creates controversy
in a way that someone wrote in a weblog: “I am extremely excited.” Another blogger
took it even more seriously and wrote: “this picture tells the biggest story in three
decades of Iranian politics. The moment when love is formally recognized.”21
In a demonstration of mobilizing for women rights, Mousavi’s wife, Zahra
Rahnavard, appeared in an election campaign video clip along with one of Iran’s well
known and respected actresses and a former woman minister to highlight her husband’s
plans for defending women’s rights. The state’s policies and conservative laws against
women were strongly criticized in that video clip. This was also the first time after the
1979 revolution that a candidate’s wife was campaigning for elections alongside her
husband. The videos of Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard visiting different cities for
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election campaign were flouting on social networking websites and Youtube, adding to
the excitement of the youth to participate in the elections.
A study of Iran’s blogosphere on election eve finds that Mousavi had broader
support in the online blog community than Ahmadinejad.22 The study suggests that there
has been as interesting contrast between Ahmadinejad’s emtedadmehr.com website,
whose links are very concentrated in the Conservative Politics cluster, and
Mousavi’s mirhussein.com webpage, whose links are from all over the map, not just the
reformist politics group. The study also finds a vast number of links coming out from the
poetry cluster, which rarely links to political sites. Also, Mousavi has even more links
from the CyberShi’a than Ahmadinejad. The study affirms that “this online interest
doesn’t necessarily translate to the offline world, but it may indicate a broader level of
excitement about Mousavi in the electorate, particularly among those outside his
expected base of supporters, which could ultimately lead to higher voter turnout for
Mousavi” (Kelly and Etling, 2009).
In an interview with the Aljazeera English during the election campaign, one of
Mousavi’s campaign advisors indicated the importance of Internet and social media for
the campaign, as the reformists were skeptical of state media policies that they believed
were mostly in favor of Ahmadinejad. For us, Saeed Shariati says, “the Internet is like the
air force in a military campaign. It bombards the enemy’s positions and lays the
groundwork for the infantry,our volunteers, so that they can win battles on the ground.”23
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Many of Mousavi’s election rallies where organized on Facebook, such as the 25
kilometer human chain of his support.24
The use of Youtube for the campaign was also unprecedented. Many young
Iranians used the video-sharing website in creative ways to get their message crossed.
One video showed Iranians in Tehran and different countries around the world with
banners that read “I will vote,” as part of the campaign by the supporters of Mousavi and
Karoubi to encourage as many people to vote.25 As the journalist and blogger Hamid
Tehrani notes, the Youtube videos were also used for fact checking. During the campaign
Mousavi and many other activists from the reform camp accused Ahmadinejad of lying
to the nation and basing state policies on superstitions. Ahmadinejad denied, during a
televised debate with one of his reformist candidates that he ever claimed a “halo”
surrounded him during a United Nations (UN) address in 2005. A video clip on YouTube
shows that Ahmadinejad did in fact say that a light enveloped him during his address to
the UN General Assembly and that the crowd stared without blinking during the entire
speech,26 shaming the incumbent. Candidates and their supporters also took advantage of
Youtube to publish their campaign videos. Many well-known figures of Iranian film
industry, including Majid Majidi, Dariush Mehrjoee, Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, and
Mohsen Makhmalbaf, supported the reformists and participated in or produced video
campaigns for Mousavi and Karoubi.
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THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE ICTS
According to Iran’s Telecommunication Statistical Indexes, mobile subscriber
activation had reached 32,292,513 by September 2009 and mobile subscriber penetration
rates were 44% of the population. The same data indicates that national Internet users had
reached 23,000,000 in 2009 compared to only 8,800,000 in 2006. A little less than half of
Iran’s population are using mobile phones in their day-to-day lives, nearly a quarter of
them are connected to the Internet. The images and videos of their demonstrations in the
aftermath of the 2009 disputed elections were brought to the world’s attention through
the social media and video sharing websites such as Youtube.
On Friday, June 12, 2009, enthusiastic crowds turned to the voting stations to cast
their votes, many polling stations had to remain open longer than planned due to long
queues. Within two hours of the polls closing the vote was announced: 62.6 percent for
Ahmadinejad.27 The reported vote remained constant for all subsequent areas of the
country. This rapid declaration of a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad was immediately
rejected by the other three candidates, including the second conservative candidate,
Rezaii. The reformist camp questioned the outcome for the speed of the declaration, for
the actual figures given (which remained constant), and for the lack of variation by region
in Iran (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010, p.172).
Mousavi who at least was hopeful for a second round, insisted he was the victor
and appealed against the result to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader. In a
letter he rejected the results: “I personally strongly protest the many obvious violations
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and I'm warning I will not surrender to this dangerous charade,” and emphasized that,
“the result will jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic republic and establish tyranny.”28
Quickly the slogan of a ‘stolen election’ spread and ‘where is my vote?’ became a
national outcry of many Iranians who believed that their votes were ignored. Hundreds of
demonstrators wearing Mousavi's signature green color marched down Vali-Asr Avenue
demanding all Iranians to support them and shouting slogans such as “Mousavi, give us
our votes back,” and “the election was full of lies,” before being dispersed.29 Within an
hour, first video of the demonstrations emerged on Youtube and quickly was shared on
social networking websites.
In an effort to avoid any calls for vote cancelation and recount, Ayatollah
Khamenei, in a statement issued on state television on Saturday afternoon, congratulated
Ahmadinejad on his victory and pointedly urged the other candidates to support him.30
Later, in a televised address on Saturday night, Ahmadinejad called on the public to
respect the results, and he denounced foreign diplomatic and journalistic criticism. “All
political and propaganda machines abroad and sections inside the country have been
mobilized against the nation,” he declared.31 However, seeing the pressure and the public
anger over the result, the Supreme Leader on Monday, June 15, ruled a partial recount of
the votes, that he had endorsed earlier, and appealed to the nation to remain calm.32
These efforts to calm the protests and bring back the situation to normal were not
28
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effective. Defying the interim ministry’s ban of any gatherings and demonstrations,
people took to the streets in numbers.
Over the next few days the crowds got bigger. During the week of June 15-18
Tehran witnessed the biggest demonstrations in 30 years, as over a million people
marched in the city and the demonstrations ended at nights in violent clashes between the
government militia and the peaceful demonstrators, who showed their non-violent
intentions in the rally of silence of June 17.33 On June 18, Mousavi called on his
supporters to rally and promised to attend the rally himself. According to a report by The
New York Times34 the silent rally was a deliberate and striking contrast to the chaos of the
past few days, when riot police officers sprayed tear gas and wielded clubs to disperse
scattered bands of angry and frightened young people. When the occasional shout or
chant went up, the crowd quickly hushed it, and some held up signs demonstrating the
word “silence.” The crowds were refusing to invite any retaliation from the security
forces, and called for a vote recount or annulations. Protesters were especially enraged
that Ahmadinejad on Sunday dismissed them as nothing more than soccer fans who had
just lost a game and as “dirt and dust.” One demonstrator’s Twitter message read,
“Ahmadinejad called us dust, we showed him a sandstorm.”35
Despite a warning from the Supreme Leader during Friday’s prayers of June 19,
about the harsh consequences of continuing to protest,36 movement adherents were
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defiant. They turned out to the streets on June 20, in massive numbers. The day marks the
death of Neda, whose death was captured on mobile phones, and was published hours
later on Youtube and was shared through other social networking websites and buzzed
the Internet. The video received incredible attention and evoked widespread sympathy
throughout the world.37 Barack Obama described it as heartbreaking, Oxford University
established a new scholarship in her name, and a street in Rome was named Neda.38 Neda
soon became both a symbol of the opposition movement and the ruthless nature of the
regime. On the same day a status update on Mousavi’s official Facebook read “today you
are the media, it is your duty to report and keep the hope alive.”39 Mousavi’s long-form
statement to the nation also was not communicated as a release to the press; rather it was
posted as a note on the candidate’s Facebook page.
Some have called the post-election aftermath a ‘Twitter Revolution’ due to the
astonishing role of social networking sites.40 During the heated moments of the turmoil,
the US State Department asked Twitter to postpone its planned maintenance to allow
Iranian protesters to use the service for communicative purposes.41 Google and Facebook
announced that they would add a Farsi version to their websites in response to
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widespread use during the protests.42 The critical role of the Internet in the protests was
recognized by the International Academy of Digital Arts and Sciences as one of the ten
most influential Internet moments of the decade.43
In the days that followed and during the summer of 2009, Many Iranians on
Facebook changed their avatars to a green square that included the text ‘where is my
vote?’ While many non-Iranians tweaked the icon to ‘where is their vote?’ Facebook
turned green. It became a space for posting video (sometime culled from Youtube),
articles (culled from the international media and sometimes the Iranian press),
photographs that had been sent by mobile or e-mail attachment from people in Iran.
Facebook became an enormous distribution site of new and recycled material. One could
watch a new post being picked up and shared almost instantly, seeing it move across
Facebook.
The demonstrators framed their actions around one color, ‘green’, with a ‘stolen
vote’, as the central message and language of the movement to speak out their grievances.
The color green became the broadest signifier of the Movement. Green morphed from
Mousavi’s campaign color during the election to the color for all opposition and
reformists groups in the post election period. Karoubi’s followers and even people who
did not vote but were critical of the regime’s brutality against the peaceful protests began
to use the color. Green soon appeared at public events, football matches, festivals and so
forth. Although Mousavi had attached religious meaning to this color at the time of the
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election, by this time it was devoid of religious meaning, so seculars felt comfortable in
using it to represent their cause.
In response, the state intended to cut off all means of communication among the
public. Most leaders of reformist parties were arrested and demonstrations were declared
illegal. Overt signs of repression included the failure of phone lines for hours after the
polls closed and the blocking of the English and Persian-language websites of the BBC
and Voice of America—which are regularly attacked by the Iranian authorities as
‘imperialist.’ Text messaging also failed. The regime also put up a website named gerdab
(“vortex”) that was aimed at intimidating the protesters by putting their pictures on the
website, threatening them, and asking the public to identify them.44 In response to this,
the Green Movement came up with its own such website gerdab-e-sabz (“the green
vertex”), trying to shame the Basij (Islamic Republic’s semi-militia) and the security
forces by publishing their names and pictures on the website.45 Websites of both sides
were under continuous cyber-attacks by ‘hacktivists’, which led to temporary disruption
of the websites.46
Protesters used their mobile phones to record the events, including police brutality,
and then uploaded these images onto the Internet. Hundreds of pictures and videos
quickly appeared on the Internet and the links were shared on Facebook. Despite the slow
speed of home Internet connections, people were successful in uploading their videos and
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photos. The latest news on the protests was therefore available online. This was the only
way of getting news out of the country, as all foreign news agencies had been forced to
leave by then.47
In the beginning the protests tended to start spontaneously, however, in later
weeks and months, shared strategies, a collective identity, a loose structure and
leadership, and visions for the future were gradually fashioned. There was a cycle
between the streets and the Internet: people planned a demonstration, discussed the
slogans and strategies on the web, actualized the plans in the streets and confronted the
security forces, then turned back to the Internet and published the pictures, news and
videos of the incidents, discussed the outcomes and prepared for the next demonstration.
The wide geographical coverage and the amateur quality of the video footage
indicated that these activities were of an unorganized nature and pointed to individual
actions taken by individual people (Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010). The Green
Movement adopted what Ashraf calls a “hydra approach.”48 Each individual within the
Green Movement became a leader; “each individual became a “digital node,” which
made the regime's attempts to squash it desperate.
The Green Movement is dependent upon websites, but it is not dependent upon
any one website. During the height of the protests, activists set up a blog to advertise a
protest, and when it was taken down, a new blog was put up. The Movement was also
adept at bringing its online work to bear in the physical world. For example, stencils and
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flyers were created online and shared throughout the Blogistan, then printed out and used
during protests. Ashraf notes that during the massive crack downs on the streets and on
the cyberspace “the Green Movement’s response, basically, has been to create a digital
movement whose leader is itself, whose central organizing structure is viral, with ebbs
and flows that adapt to the constantly changing and shifting digital and social landscape
in post-election Iran.”49
The Green Movement effectively employed the Internet to disseminate
information and to recruit and mobilize people to participate in the protest. Before each
rally, activists uploaded a great number of posters, video clips and songs on the Internet,
in an attempt to attract large numbers of people to turn out. Activists proposed many
slogans, and the main opposition figures issued statements to encourage people to come
out in support. During these demonstrations, protesters captured eye-catching incidents
with their mobiles, and sent them via “desktops to television screens” (Bennet, 2003).
The use of ICT paved the way for many individuals to actively participate and to have
their voices heard in this era of mass ‘self-communication.’ The Internet and especially
the social networking websites, first, acted as the main information and organizing
platform for the protesters and opposition. Second, they created a bridge between Iran
and abroad. This campaign outside Iran in support of the demonstration could not have
been possible with the help of many citizen journalists posting their accounts and videos
of the situation on the ground on the social media.
The opposition took the regime’s repression as a key means of attracting global
media attention and successfully influenced the public agenda. All this was done by
mobile phones and the Internet in a “micro-to-macro crossover” (Bennet, 2003, p.161).
49

	
  Ibid	
  

	
  

63	
  

Diffusion of the Green Movement was accelerated incredibly by the Internet, allowing
for access to Iranian networks all over the world. Pictures and videos of the regime’s
brutality evoked strong feelings of sympathy throughout the Iranian diaspora.
Unprecedented solidarity with the protest movement emerged from Iranians abroad and
several demonstrations were held in support of the Green movement in the US, Canada,
some European countries, Australia and Asia.50 Iranians abroad called upon their host
governments not to recognize Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president and to condemn the
violation of human rights in Iran. In one case, a “green roll” was publicized in Paris. It
was signed by thousands of Iranians from 167 cities around the world and stated
“Ahmadinejad is not Iran’s president.”51 All these organizations and networks would
have been inconceivable without the assistance of ICTs.
At first the protests were spontaneously formed to discredit the election, however,
along the way, the contours of a collective identity appeared. During the election
campaign, Mousavi’s supporters used a green shadow over their profile pictures on
Facebook. Sawer (2007) argues that colors influence the ‘emotional life of social
movements’ and help them to fashion collective identities. Furthermore, a large amount
of artistic work served to promote an integrated sense of belonging amongst those
involved in the Movement. An abundance of music, posters and video clips were made
and published on the Internet by amateurs and was shared among circles of friends and
activists. The themes were about commemoration of the martyrs and the suffering of their
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mothers, hopes for a victory and a better future, and the regime’s cruelty; all of which
served to reinforce the Green Movement’s collective identity (Sohrabi-Haghighat and
Mansouri, 2010).
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ICT USAGE
Laying out the historical, social, and political context on the web and process
tracing the movement’s adherent activities in their use of ITCs points to indications for
the role of ICTs in emergence and form of social movements that challenge the state
power. The importance of such tools in today’s mass communication era can be
categorized into four types of uses: informational, conversational, symbolic, and
organizational.
The ICTs and mainly, the Internet, provide a space to access information without
censorship imposed by authoritarian regimes. The Internet is a convenient way for
information dissemination around the world. ICTs, by connecting activists to other
adherents, the diaspora, and the main stream media, functions as the main source of
information. The emotions involved in this kind of information dissemination (seeing a
citizen dying on the streets) are high and contribute to gathering more adherents and
sympathizers both inside and outside of a polity for a movement. The ability to use
technologies to get the information and to interconnect people, rapidly and in real-time
around the world, made ICTs a valuable tool for activists.
Further, Dutton (1999) reminds us that the focus of the information age should not
be “information”, but “access.” The Internet has changed the rules by taking part in the
political system. In the same vein, in examination of Iran’s blogosphere three
interconnected issues should be accounted for: first, a vast number of voices and ideas
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that find a space to be heard; second, the space that is provided for these individuals and
organizations to express their views, which can be counted as a form of a resource
mobilization tool, should we count the individuals as political capitals of one country;
and third, the range of topics that they introduce into the public sphere, thus surpassing
the Islamic Republic’s censorship of many social issues and making public previously
inarticulate and un-noticed social issues, such as gender relations, or political discussions
(Sreberny and Khiabany,2010). More important than being seen as a solely informational
tool, the ICTs have provided a space for different and opposite points of views to be
heard and engage in on-going conversations on different topics. In the case of the Green
Movement, and in the absence of any formal social movement networks in the real world
because of the oppression, the Internet has created such space. The conversation and
debate flourished and at some points outburst both during the election campaign and the
course of the Green Movement.
As a “stolen vote” created a collective identity and was politicized with relative
deprivation of movement adherents in comparison with the status quo, the symbolic uses
of ICTs became into play. Seeing social media websites and Youtube as their main
resource under repression to discuss and enforce their collective identity, movement
adherents started to frame their actions and discourse by using the ICTs. Almost all the
demonstrations (such as the “silent protest”) were planned and discussed on the Internet
(in social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter) and by taking advantage of the
ICTs. Adherents framed the movement under one color; green, named it at first under a
“stolen vote,” discussed its strategies through non-violent means, and used the social
media and Youtube as the main platform for creating images, and uploading videos of the
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sacrifices in the real time which arises emotions such as shock, fear, anger, and that may
draw more participants into the movement.
The organizational aspect of ICTs with vast connectivity in an environment such
as Iran also becomes clear by process tracing the adherents’ activities. After each
demonstration the next steps were discussed and images and videos of the day were
uploaded. In this sense the ICTs had both their instrumental and symbolic uses. I argue
that the ICTs were the main platform for Green Movement adherents to discuss, frame,
and organize their strategies in the face of repression. This can prove true in authoritarian
states other than the case of the Green Movement, where unlike many open societies the
Internet is not one way of mass ‘micro-communication’; rather it is the only way.
ICTs are one variable in emergence and form of social movements. In the case of
the Green Movement their informational, conversational, symbolic, and organizational
function as the main platform for framing and then organizing the movement cannot be
ignored. Considering ICTs as another tool, taking up the role of radio, television, and
cassette tapes during 1970s, to disseminate information and mobilize masses would be
shortsighted. There are over 70,000 active bloggers in Iran today (Sreberny and
Khiabany, 2010). The importance of ICTs should be assessed in terms of
interconnectivity and access and space that they provide for grassroots to explore and
discuss many social and political topics, bypassing the state’s control. Their role needs to
be analyzed in the social and cultural context of each movement and with a broader look
at the space that they provide during years prior to eruption of an emotional and
revolutionary social movement. In a social movement and under the state’s control, this
space is the platform for conversation, deliberation, and decision-making.
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The fact that many Mousavi and Karoubi supporters—the young and old
individuals, sometimes without any political affiliations—turned to the Internet as
activists and volunteers to help the campaign, and later turned to Green Movement
adherents, is in congruity with the loose structure and non-ideological aspect of the
movement. Its strategies and organization are mainly discussed on the web (the social
media and the blogs), between “informal social networks,” which gives everyone a voice.
It is not dependent upon a central organization or website, and does not follow any
specific ideology, rather it is dependent on every individual’s creativity and deliberative
agency that gave the movement its momentum. On one side there were the most powerful
arms of the Islamic system of government: the Supreme Leader, the military, the
revolutionary guard, and the Guardian Council. On the other side was a loosely structured
and diverse coalition that was grown emboldened by the day, with some clerics joining
Mousavi and Karoubi. But a movement’s success or failure in achieving its goals depends
on the interplay of other variables in which the political opportunity structure, resource
mobilization, and framing process constantly interact. This will be discussed in chapter
four.
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CHAPTER III:
OPPOSITION FIGURES AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
A look at Green Movement’s leaders’ biography and political activities reveals
that they are Islamic Republic system “insiders” and can be considered as founding
fathers of the regime. This explicit demonstration of the cracks among elites, which was
indivisibly in place since the early days of revolution in 1979, was a result of 2009
elections and its aftermath; the Green Movement. Per my proposed methodology, I will
use process tracing to reveal the role of the two main opposition figures (Mousavi and
Karoubi) of the movement in emergence and form of the Green Movement. This will also
help to figure out the congruities with this thesis’ hypotheses.
Thus, in this chapter, first I will look at the biography and political activities of
Mousavi and Karoubi since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Second, I will
examine their role in the emergence and form of the Green Movement as its so-called
leaders, through process tracing and concurrence method by taking into account their
activities and statements in the height of the protests. Third, drawing upon the Green
Movement’s leadership style and characteristics the implications for resource
mobilization, framing processes and political opportunity structures will be discussed.
This allows for theory testing and its expansion to other cases. An introduction to
leadership in social movements is necessary.
LEADERSHIP IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Morris and Staggenborge (2004) argue that leaders are critical to social movements:
they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise
strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes. They recognize a lacuna in theorizing
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leadership, as the scholars have failed to fully integrate agency and structure. According
to them we cannot neglect structure in expense of agency and nor can we ignore agency.
Further emphasis on the leaders seems to unfairly relegate the critical masses of
movement to the category of followers (Barker et.al, 2001). Thus, in analyzing the role of
leadership we need to pay attestation to the political and cultural contexts of the
movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, movement culture (the framing processes) and
agency are in a close relationship.
There are functional roles played by the leaders at different stages of a movement
development (Wilson, 1973). Gusfield (1966), as cited by Morris and Staggenborge,
identifies two roles for a leader; inside of the movement as a “mobilizer,” inspiring
participants, and outside of the movement as an “articulator,” linking the movement to
the larger society. These roles change over time and according to movement
development. Many draw on Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership, a relational
approach that assigns a key role to the followers in inputting charisma to leaders. Melucci
(1996) argues that the Weberian theory of charisma leads to the neglect of social
relationship between leaders and followers, who are viewed as ceding to a charismatic
leader and therefore lacking agency.
Others have explained both the ways in which leaders affect movement
organization and how movement characteristics shape leadership. Expanding on Weber’s
relational approach, Wilson (1973) distinguishes among charismatic, ideological, and
pragmatic types of leaders and their associated types of movement organization.
Leadership type affects centralization of decision-making, division of labor and the extent
to which organization is subject to schism. Zald and Ash (Zald and Ash, 1966) point to
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the ways in which organizational characteristics such as structural requirements for
membership, affects the demands placed on leaders. An exclusive organization, for
example, would require its leaders to focus on mobilizing tasks, while an inclusive
organization would be more likely to have leaders with an articulating style.
By the same token, leaders from different types of backgrounds shape
organizational structures in accordance with their previous experiences, influencing the
mobilization, strategies, and outcome of the movement. Morris and Staggenborge (2004)
argue that a key theoretical issue is the extent to which the characteristics and actions of
leaders, as opposed to structural conditions, matter. Different types of leaders come out of
different organizational structures. Political and cultural context of the movement affects
leadership. Leaders operate within structures, and they both influence and are influenced
by movement’s organization and environment. Both structural limitations and
opportunities for social movements and the ways in which leaders make a difference
within structural contexts need to be examined. The movement culture is also important
in analyzing leadership in a social movement.
BIOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE TWO MAIN
OPPOSITION FIGURES
A brief study of the biography of the two candidates who turned to opposition
figures in the aftermath of the 2009 elections shows that they held several key posts in the
Islamic Republic system. These two candidates were also opposition figures during the
1979 revolution, which overthrow the Pahlavi regime. This explicitly indicates splits
among officials with leftist, rightist, and fundamentalist affiliations in the Islamic
republic system that did not surface before in the formation of opposition. Most of the
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reformists are now considered opposition figures and are in jail. This also can be
considered as the end of reform era inside the system since it has lost its position inside
the system and has turned into a form of opposition.
MIR HOSSEIN MOUSAVI
Mousavi has a master’s degree in architecture and urban development from one of
the most prominent universities of Tehran. He was one of the co-founders of this
university’s Islamic Council before the revolution. During the 1960s and early 1970s he
was close to national-religious groups such as the Liberation Front. In the early 1960s he
married Zahra Rahnavard, a student of sculpture at the time. She was also one of the
prominent activists who fought the Shah’s regime. In the years leading to Iran’s
revolution and with Khomeini’s role as the leader of the revolutionary course becoming
more prominent, Mousavi joined Khomeini’s allies.
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic party in the early days after the
revolution, Mousavi joined, and became its political secretary. He was also the editor in
chief of a newspaper named Islamic Republic, affiliated with the party. During the 1980s
he was named the foreign minister. After Rajaii and Bahonar (the time president and
prime minister) were assassinated in an explosion, Khamenei became the president. His
first nominee for prime minister did not get enough votes from Iran’s assembly, and
despite the differences between Khamenei and Mousavi in the Islamic Republic party,
Khamenei declared Mousavi as the prime minister of the assembly. Many believe that
this choice was a direct result of Khomeini’s support for Mousavi. Mousavi was Iran’s
prime minster from that period until after Khomeini’s death in 1989.
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Differences between Khamenei, who was considered closer to the right wing of
Islamic revolution, and Mousavi, who was closer to the left wing, continued in their eight
years of cooperation as president and the prime minister. A split led to Mousavi’s
resignation after the end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988.The resignation was strongly rejected
by Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Since almost all of Mousavi’s term as
prime minister was accompanied by the Iran-Iraq war, he is usually referred to as ‘the
prime minister of war.’
With the revision of the Iranian Constitution in 1989, the prime minister’s role was
eliminated. Khomeini’s death meant that Mousavi and the left wing of the Islamic
Republic lost their principle supporter. Meanwhile, Mousavi left his life as a politician
and returned to the world of art, where he belonged before the revolution. It is worth
mentioning that since then, Mousavi has held several marginal posts in the system. In
1989 he became a member of the Expediency Council, which continued until the
emergence of the Green Movement. He was also a member of the Supreme Council for
Cultural Revolution. Mousavi was political advisor to former president, Rafsanjani,
during eight years of his presidency. During Khatami’s presidency he was also his main
advisor. The eight years of Khatami’s presidency are known as reform era within the
system, as many reformists were elected to Majles-e Shora-e Islami (Iran’s Islamic
Assembly) and occupied several key positions.
The main activities pursued by Mousavi during an almost twenty year absence
from political controversy were academic and artistic. Since the mid 1970s he has been
teaching in several universities and colleges in Tehran. In 1999, he was chosen as the
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chair of Iran’s arts academy by then president Khatami and continued his activities with
that role. Several monuments in Tehran and other cities are the work of his hand.
MEHDI KAROUBI
Mehdi Karoubi, the other presidential candidate in the 2009 elections who joined
Mousavi in denouncing the election results, is also a well-known figure and an Islamic
Republic insider. During the revolution he was close to Ayatollah Khomeini and held
several key posts since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, i.e. the presidency of
Majles for several terms is one of these key posts. Other key posts include the presidency
of Bonyad-e Shahid Enghelab-e Islami (Islamic Republic’s Martyrdom Foundation). In
1991,during the first round of Majles elections after Khomeini’s death, the Guardian
Council with a new interpretation of law rejected the candidacy of many leftist in a party
newly established by Karoubi and Khatami and those close to the wing Khat-e Imam
(“Imam’s Path”). The Islamic Republic’s leftists were almost sidelined from 1991 until
1997 and the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.
In 1997 presidential elections, Karoubi along with other well-known figures of the
Islamic Republic’s leftists tried to convince Mousavi to declare his candidacy for the
elections. It was a call that Mousavi rejected. With the election of Khatami as president in
1997 and a landslide win for reformists in Majles elections, Karoubi returned to power
again as the president of Majles. During his second term as Majles president, he has been
close to reformists and has criticized some of Islamic Republic’s polices, but many
criticize him for compromising freedom of the press by accepting Khamenei’s Hokm-e
Hokoomati (“State rule”)52 to reject such reform.
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By the end of sixth Majles with the presidency of Karoubi, differences between
him and the reformists were obvious. Not only did he not participate in a sit-in by more
than one hundred reformists in an attempt to protest against the Guardian Council’s
rejection of the candidacy of many reformists for next round of Majles, rather he
announced his objection to the sit-in. He once again declared his candidacy for the Majles
elections despite the fact that many reformists refused to announce any candidates for the
seventh Majles elections, which he was not able to enter. During these years he was also
involved in a financial scandal, which proved controversial within the regime.
In 2005, for the first time Mehdi Karoubi announced his candidacy for presidential
elections. None of the reformist parties including the Majma-e Rohaniyoon-e Mobarez
(“assembly of combatant clerics”), of which he was the secretary general at the time,
supported his candidacy. He resigned as a member of the party. In 2005 elections he
came in third after Ahmadinejad was declared president and Rafsanjani came second. He
criticized the results and wrote an open letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in
which he accused Khamenei’s son of supporting one of the candidates. He also declared
that he would resign from all of his official posts such as the supreme leader’s advisor
status and membership of the Expediency Council. He stated that he would establish a
public party, which was inaugurated the same year under the name of Hezb-e Etemad-e
Melli (“National Trust party”) with Karoubi as its secretary general. A newspaper with
the same name was also published which was associated with the reformists during
Ahmadinejad’s first term.53
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THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE OPPOSITION FIGURES
In the presidential elections of 1989 and 1993, Rafsanjani was a candidate without
any strong challengers and by winning the elections he served as president for eight
years. However, by1997 the politicians of the left wing of the Islamic Republic who were
trying to find a candidate to fight the conservative camp asked Mousavi to announce his
candidacy. He did not accept this call, and Mohammad Khatami declared his candidacy.
After eight years of Khatami’s presidency and a flourishing of debate on reform inside
the system, the left wing, which was now known as the reformists, went after Mousavi
again. He rejected a run for presidency, and Ahmadinejad was declared president. It is
worth to noting that there were also allegations of vote rigging in the 2005 elections,
namely and the loudest ones from one of the opposition figures in the Green Movement,
Mehdi Karoubi, who also ran for president in 2005. On the morning of the announcement
of the election results in 2005, Karoubi rejected the results and famously declared that ‘I
only slept for a couple of hours at night and in the early morning the results were
completely changed.’ Analysis of the 2005 elections are beyond the scope of this thesis,
but in the 2009 elections, Karoubi campaigners organized a page on Facebook under the
title “we are awake this time.”54
When the 10th presidential race of the Islamic Republic gained momentum in
2009, many reformists again turned to Mousavi. He did not reject the call immediately
and postponed his decision. Meanwhile, Karoubi had declared his candidacy months
before. In fact he was among the first who declared that he would compete with
Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections. Despite the fact that none of the main reformist parties,
54
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except his own party, supported his candidacy, some of the well-known figures of these
parties joined his election campaign such as Mohammad Ali Abtahi. His main campaign
slogan was “change” and he declared himself a guardian of citizens’, women’s, and
different ethnic minorities’ rights.
After months of negotiations among reformists, especially between Khatami and
Mousavi, Mousavi declared his candidacy and Khatami gave his support to the campaign.
The details of negotiations between Khatami and Mousavi are not clear, although after a
few weeks the majority of reformist parties announced their support of Mousavi and
despite his first statement, his second statement was closer to the reformist language. In
his campaign he strongly criticized Ahmadinejad’s policies and the unlawfulness of his
government’s activities.
Announcing his candidacy for the presidential race in a televised address to the
nation, Mousavi declared “I am fighting in this race because I have found the current
political, economic, and cultural processes worrying.”55 In their campaigns, both
Karoubi and Mousavi repeatedly targeted Ahmadinejad’s policies and announced that
they were there to fight against “unlawfulness” and “lying” and that this caused them to
feel “danger.” In their televised debate, Mousavi and Karoubi devoted the greatest part
of their time to criticizing Ahmadinejad instead of debating their own election plans. In
the debate referring to this unlawfulness and “strange powers” growing out of the
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government boundaries in the recent years, Karoubi asked Mousavi if he was ready for
the difficulties and problems ahead.56
Declaring himself a reformist, Karoubi asked Mousavi to determine whether he
considered himself a reformist or a fundamentalist, Mousavi then declared that he was a
reformist with a reference to the “fundamentals.”57 By that he meant the early years of
the Islamic Republic (the Imam-Khomeini era) and a return to true Islamic values free of
corruption. Mousavi and Karoubi have always referred to Islamic values as their principle
ideology and never rejected the notion of “rule of the jurist” (velayat-e faghih), referred
to the Supreme Leader, in their statements and speeches both during and after the
elections. Although they tried to delegitimize the Supreme Leader by writing letters to
him and seeking to make him use his authority to end the violence against the civilians.
This explains what placed these opposition figures at odds with the Green
Movement at its beginning. The majority of those taking part in the street demonstrations
were youth with no specific religious ideology. This can be inferred from their slogans
during the demonstrations (and even from the way they dress); “independence, freedom,
Iranian republic,”58 instead of “Islamic Republic,” which was one of the main slogans
during the 1979 revolution. They clearly denounced the Supreme Leader: “Khamenei is a
murderer, thus his rule is annulled,” or clearly chanting “death to Khamenei” and “death
to the dictator.” At one point they set a picture of Khamenei on fire.
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Whether it was a strategy on the part of Mousavi and Karoubi not to reject the rule
of the jurist in order to be able to continue their political activities and to frame their
activities within the framework of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, as well as
gathering more supporters from diverse backgrounds to the movement, the distinction is
clear between the majority of the Green Movement adherents and these two figures.
In his second statement, Mousavi declared, “we as people who believe in Islamic
Republic and its Constitution, recognize velayat-e-faghih as one the bases of the regime,
and will follow our political activities within the Constitution’s framework.”59
Meanwhile he announced that he has asked the Guardian Council for a vote cancellation,
and referring to article 27 of the same Constitution, he demanded the interior ministry to
publish a permit for peaceful demonstrations across the country for people to show their
objections to the election process and the results.
This has put Mousavi and Karoubi in the role of moral leaders of the Green
Movement rather than a charismatic leadership with the crowd seen only as followers
without any agency. They are moral leaders of the movements in terms of trying to cast it
under a non-violent framework and slow down the revolutionary course that may result in
violence, and to a lesser extent they are acting as pragmatic leaders in doing so. Also by
referring to the Constitution and appealing to the Supreme Leader’s authority to end the
violence against civilians, they further delegitimized the regime, which did not act upon
its constitution. The implication of this for the Green Movement leadership will be
discussed later in this chapter.
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In his first statement the day after the election results were announced, Mousavi
called the results “astonishing”60 and declared that people are watching the elections
authority’s and the state owned media’s “jugglery” in changing the results. He continued,
“I declare my harsh objection to this process and the obvious and extensive violations on
the Election Day, and warn that I will not concur to this dangerous show.”61 He suggested
that the authorities turn back to the rule of law and Islamic Republic’s Constitution before
it was too late and warned that injustice delegitimizes a state, and called for vote
cancelation. He also emphasized that in order to achieve “our” goals people need to
continue their efforts and continue what they did before the elections. In his next
statements, Mousavi repeatedly described himself as only one follower and comrade of
the movement.
By the same token, in an open letter to the Guardian Council, Karoubi asked the
council to follow its legitimate duty and declare the election results null. He asked the
council to cancel the vote and prepare for a new round of elections and by doing so save
the regime. He argued that there is a danger of people turning against the council.
Karoubi also gave his compliments and blessing to the street demonstrators and criticized
the regime for relating them to “foreign powers.”62 In the same letter, Karoubi argued
that the high turnout was because people hoped there would be no vote rigging if they
turned out in numbers, but that unfortunately there is a “mafia of power” that
manipulated all the process.
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After the Guardian Council formed a group to investigate the alleged irregularities
by only counting 10 percent of the votes, Karoubi in a letter to the council announced he
would appoint his representative to the group only if his two conditions are respected.
First, the members should be independent, which two of them are not and should be
replaced. In the letter he noted that “some members of this group have held some harsh
partisan stances, and as a matter of fact their dependent position in the group is already
clear.”63 Second, if the Guardian Council decided to investigate all the irregularities
reported by the defeated candidates, which go beyond counting only 10 percent of the
votes.64 In the same letter he also insisted on vote cancellation; referring to the
irregularities both before the election and on the day of the elections, and irregularities in
announcing the election results, he declared that “each one of these are sufficient reasons
to cancel the election results.”65 He went on to count different reasons for his request of
vote cancellation such as the state’s alleged numbers for voters were greater than those
eligible to vote. Referring to the Islamic Republic Constitution, he also argued that
“individual competency” of the president is one of the basis of the Constitution which in
his opinion was compromised by Ahmadinejad’s selection.
In the open letters that Karoubi wrote to the Islamic Republic’s officials, he
repeatedly referred to the demonstrators as the “majority” of voters. He declared he did
not consider the government formed after these elections “legitimate.” He clarified that
both Ahmadinejad supporters and the demonstrators are part of the country, but he
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believed that Ahmadinejad supporters are in minority and that no one can impose their
vote on others. He also proposed two different dates to be considered for each of the
supporters to be able to come to the streets peacefully to determine which camp is in
majority.
During the height of the protests, both Mousavi and Karoubi repeatedly asked for
permission from the Guardian Council and the interior ministry for their supporters to
carry out peaceful demonstrations across the country. All of those requests were rejected.
Despite the fact that the authorities rejected the calls for peaceful demonstrations,
Mousavi and Karoubi appeared in several street demonstrations among the crowd in the
height of the protests. In one of those Mousavi addressed the crowd, promising to stand
by the people until the end. His wife, Zahra Rahnavard was beside him, with a follower
in her hands, symbolizing peace.66 The requests to carry out peaceful demonstrations
based on freedom of assembly, which is embedded in the Islamic Republic’s constitution,
further delegitimized the state by not even allowing the opposition to use the capacities
and rights allocated to them under the constitution. It also helped to frame the protests in
a non-violent and lawful manner, seeking to act under the constitution.
Both Mousavi and Karoubi have considered the Islamic Republics’ Constitution as
a framework for the opposition, emphasizing on the capacities for reform and change
under the same Constitution only if the officials act upon it. Despite appearing among the
protesters in the early days of demonstrations, Mousavi and Karoubi canceled the street
protests scheduled for the first anniversary of the Green Movement in fear of high levels
of violence planned by the regime, after not being able to get authorization from the
66
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officials. This resulted in many analysts criticizing them for exhausting the youthful
energy and opportunities that are embedded in street demonstrations. In their letters and
statements, both of these figures warned the crowd against engaging in violent activities
with Basiji’s and other regime elements and asked the demonstrators to remain peaceful
while insisting on their legitimate rights.
The wives of Mousavi and Karoubi played an important role in promoting women
rights during the presidential campaign and encouraging people to vote. This was the first
time in the history of the Islamic Republic that candidates were seen alongside their
wives in public on the campaign trips, showing a more moderate face. After what
followed, wives of the two (now) opposition figures gave speeches in defense of the
demonstrators and appeared among the crowd in street protests. Zahra Rahnavard,
Mousavi’s wife, is herself a well-known faculty member and a political activist. She took
part in several visits alongside Mousavi to the families of those killed or arrested during
the protests. In one of her video messages she declared that she is not afraid of getting
arrested or even killed, for she is one among many who are fighting for freedom.67
Fatemeh Karoubi has also held several official posts, from being a member of the
Majles to head of a charity organization. When their son was arrested and tortured in
prison during the protests, in an open letter to the supreme leader, she recalled the Pahlavi
regime by noting that she had raised her three children behind the Pahlavi prison doors
waiting for their father to come back home—an ironic comparison of the Islamic
Republic with the Pahlavi regime, as well as reminding the Supreme Leader of the
sacrifices made by her husband during the revolution in the years preceding 1979. She
67
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then went on to declare that her family would resist injustice. Their presence and their
defense of women rights gave the election campaign a momentum and encouraged many
to vote for these candidates in a society where women do not have same rights as men
and even often discussion of these rights has harsh consequences.
The comparison between the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic in terms of
establishment of tyranny is another key characteristic found in statements by Mousavi
and Karoubi, which further de-legitimize the regime. In a joint statement published on the
anniversary of establishment of the Islamic Republic they listed some elements of Pahlavi
tyranny such as blocking all the paths toward a gradual reform of the state and the
society; using propaganda; the illusion of playing a big role in the regional and world
politics; and sorting out all the critiques and opposition groups,68 and declared that the
current situation of the country is nothing less than re-producing the monarchial tyranny,
except it not being an inheritable style of governance. They noted that this is tyranny in
the name of religion. Mousavi and Karoubi declared the Green Movement as an
illustration of collective responsibility, of a new way of conversation against the threat of
tyranny and warned that nothing would prevent this conversation from flourishing. A
conversation while not ignoring past positive achievements, critiques past mistakes.
Cracks among elites were shown explicitly in televised debates between the
candidates. Ahmadinejad, in his debate with Mousavi, accused Rafsanjani, one of the
most prominent and influential figures in power plays of the state since 1979 revolution,
of fraud. This resulted in reactions from supporters of both sides. These televised debates
and strong criticisms of Ahmadinejad delegitimized his government. Moreover, it
68
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encouraged many to vote for Mousavi and Karoubi as they saw the explicit cracks among
elites (the left wing, the right wing, and the fundamentalists) and explicit criticism of past
policies by both of them.
In the 2009 elections and during the protests, Rafsanjani tried to calm the situation
by sometimes taking the protesters’ side and other times inviting people to follow the
rules and stay calm. On a Friday Prayer that he hosted during the street protests, he
explicitly declared his disappointment with the way the regime had handled the
demonstrations and called for release of political prisoners.69 Many Iranians attended the
prayers for a chance to hear his speech and use the regime’s event to protest. Rafsanjani,
who was a frequent speaker for the Friday Prayers has not had a chance since then to give
the sermons again at any other Friday prayers.
Karoubi was the first regime insider who revealed and publicized massive torture,
murder and sexual abuse of the demonstrators in the prisons. The most notorious one was
Kahrizak prison in Tehran. In a letter to Rafsanjani he alleged that he had evidence that
people were raped in the prisons, noting that this was not a random activity but a
common one. He warned if Rafsanjani did not respond to his letter in ten days he would
publish the letter in his party’s newspaper: Etemad-e Melli (“National Trust”). In an
article in the newspaper he wrote “you may not believe that in Islamic Republic and
under velayat-e Faghih young men and women are being sexually abused, but I am
referring to the evidence by four of these people who have been abused in the prisons.”70
He called these incidences a “catastrophe” for the Islamic regime. In an open letter to
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Karoubi, Mousavi complemented his courage to reveal these acts and noted that these are
signs of more terrible activities that we do not know yet going on in the prisons.
According to Mousavi, the regime elements were doing these acts under the pretext of
defending the Islamic republic system, not knowing that the bases of a regime are the
people. He also criticized the religious figures for keeping silent in face of such activities.
The activities of the two main opposition figures process traced in this chapter,
and their implications to frame and to some extent organize the Green Movement, are
summarized in figure 3.1. below:
Figure 3.1. Main Opposition Figures’ Activities and Their Implications
Activity/ Statement

Implications and Importance

Rejecting “unlawfulness” and “lying” by
Ahmadinejad government
Referring to Islamic values/ not rejecting
velayat-e faghih

Framing their campaign and resistance based
on “truth”/ rejecting violence
At odds with many movement adherents/
gathers support from more religious groups/
makes it divers/ slows down the revolutionary
course
De-centralized/ diverse

Only a “comrade” of the movement not its
leaders
Letters to the supreme leader and the Guardian
Council
Constitution as the movement framework
Comparison between the Islamic Republic and
Pahlavi monarchy
Zahra Rahnavard and Fatemeh Karoubi
activities
Prison revelations

Delegitimizing their authority by showing
unresponsiveness
Movement’s lawfulness and peaceful goals/
rejecting violence/delegitimizing of the system
by not acting upon law
De-legitimization/ rejecting tyranny in any
form and in name of religion
Promoting women rights and participation/
rejecting discrimination and violence
De-legitimization of Islamic rule, provoking
emotions among crowds (i.e. anger, shock)

From the content of Mousavi and Karoubi’s statements and their activities process
traced thus far, it is clear that these leaders emphasize three aspects about the Green
Movement: First, a non-violent and peaceful approach in achieving its goals, which were
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vote cancellation and ballot recounts in early stages of the movement and became more
radical with unresponsiveness of the authorities to demonstrators’ demands and massive
crack downs and arrests. The leaders of the movement on the other hand have repeatedly
emphasized that the Islamic Republic’s Constitution is the main framework for designing
the movement’s tactics in achieving its goals. As the demands of the demonstrators went
beyond vote cancellation and targeted top figures of the regime such as the Supreme
Leader, Mousavi and Karoubi, while criticizing and condemning the authorities’ actions
and demanding free elections, and while repeatedly attacking tyranny, refused to target
Velyat-e-faghih whom many see as the main obstacle to free elections and democracy.
This leads to the second aspect of the movement recognized by the Green
Movement’s so-called leaders: its lawfulness, considering Islamic Republic’s
Constitution as their framework and demanding full implementation of the law, by
emphasizing the Constitution’s Third Chapter which addresses the rights of people.
Mousavi and Karoubi statements became more radical with unresponsiveness of the
regime and harsh crackdowns on demonstrators.
Mousavi published eighteen statements from June to October 2009, during the
height of Iran’s election turmoil. Statement number eighteen is known as the Green
Movement Charter in which he describes movement’s goals, strategies, and tactics to
achieve them. Emphasizing non-violent ways to achieve the movement’s goals and the
rule of law, his statements become more radicalized in criticizing regime’s response to
demonstrators. In his 5th statement he announced his disappointment with the Guardian
Council in responding to complaints of vote rigging and stated “in this situation, they ask
us to follow up our complaints with the Guardian Council. Now this council has proved
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its dependency before, during, and after the elections. And the first rule in any judgment
is the body’s independence.”71
The third aspect of the movement emphasized by Mousavi and Karoubi is its decentralized, network-based, and diverse character, which makes it easy to debate
movement’s goals within and with its opponents outside. The revised Green Movement’s
Charter, which was published by the ‘coordinating council of the green path of hope’72
and signed by both Mousavi and Karoubi reads, “the Green Movement cannot be
considered as a centralized party, nor it can be regarded as disorganized body of people
with no specific goals […] the Green Movement has a coordinated and horizontal
organizing force in the form of real and virtual social movement networks, is based on
knowledge, conscious, and innovations of Iranian people and searches its ideals and goals
such as liberty and justice in this innovating force. This ability can change the slogan
“every Iranian, one campaign” to “every Iranian, one movement.”73 The Charter article
describes the dependence of the movement on the deliberation of Iranians who
participated in the elections and its aftermath events to change the course of political
activity in their country.
In the Green Movement’s Charter, despite other statements of Mousavi, there is
little reference to velayat-e-faghih and more emphasis on the basis of democracy such as
demanding a return to the rule of law and defying the political context of movement and
71
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the authorities’ acts which is rather based on rule by law.74 The movement’s charter
reveals one of the main strategies of the movement is achieving full implementation of
law that has been given legitimacy by people’s vote. It clarifies in another article that the
Green Movement is aware of the fact that rule of law is not synonym to instrumental
abuse of law by the rulers. The law should not be a way to repress people’s rights as
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The goals of the movement are also described as achieving liberty, social justice,
and the right of national self-determination, which were the goals of the nation during the
1979 revolution as well. The charter clarifies that only by reinforcing civil society, public
conversations and debates, education and free movement of the press, information, and
the media, can the goals of the movement be achieved. It also states that although the
movement’s framework is the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, people have the right to
debate and vote to change the Constitution (or any article of it) whenever they choose to
do so in a free and democratic atmosphere.
THE GREEN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The process tracing of activities of the main opposition figures and their statements
reveals the main characteristics of the Green Movement leadership and their congruity
with the course of actions that each of these two have taken in the height of the protest.
These four main characteristics are discussed below.
First, it is a network-based leadership, from the election campaign to the
demonstrations it has proven to be a movement based on network of individuals and not a
hieratical leadership. The political activists design strategies and if there is enough
debate, then the strategy is announced by the figures of the movement (Mousavi and
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Karoubi)75 and in their absence by the coordination council. There is little evidence of a
charismatic type of leadership in the Green Movement; based on one individual’s
decision making and a mass of followers without agency, rather moral and to some
degree pragmatic types of leadership are more dominant. The main opposition figures
have taken the role of movement’s orators that transmit the movement’s goals and
aspirations both to Islamic republic officials and to movement’s adherents and outside to
gather support.
Second, the Green Movement leadership is de-centralized. On one side, the
reformist groups are part of the movement, which because of three decades of
cooperation and political activity are better coordinated and act within a more organized
framework. But, there are secular, leftists, religious, and groups with gender, sexual, or
tribal agendas, that coordinate their activities with their core movement and with others
under the umbrella of the Green Movement. The Iranian civil society and its social
movement networks, looking back to the experience of 1979 revolution and its
shortcomings and problems, are trying to reject centralization of power in any kind.
Third, the Green Movement is a diverse and interactive movement. Its nonideological character and its adherents from diverse classes of society cannot support a
charismatic or ideological leadership and lean more toward a logical and pragmatic
leadership style. The leadership in such a diverse movement has to interact with all of its
adherents from different class, religious, and ideological backgrounds. This interaction
can take advantage of different forces and resources in order for the movement to be
successful.
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Fourth, its leadership is based on compromises. The activists of the Green
Movement have shown that they can build compromises on their minimum demand,
despite the diversity of ideas and demands. The fact that people decided to take part in
the elections despite the surveillance of the Guardian Council and despite the fact that
Mousavi and Karoubi both insisted on their loyalty to the Islamic republic’s system,
shows that the activists can categorize and prioritize their demands and take action based
on that.
Process tracing of activities and statements of Mousavi and Karoubi reveal that
these two men, rather than being movement mobilizers, hold an important role in framing
the movement in terms that were discussed above. From the color green, to accepting
different ideologies while emphasizing on Islamic values as their own main set of belief,
and denouncing violent act in the face of the regime’s repression. Although, the role of
the movement adherents in framing their options and naming the movement goals,
discussed in chapter 2, should not be overlooked. In his statement after Ashura76 2009,
Mousavi argues that people do not wait for him to publish statements and invite them to
turn out to the streets and protest; rather they have the knowledge and courage to use the
religious and regime occasions to protest. The fact that the protests started simultaneously
and the Green Movement enjoys a network-based and decentralized leadership style is
described by Abbas Milani77 as both the movement’s strength and weakness. In the short
run, the lack of a strong and centralized leadership has resulted in failure of the Green
Movement to achieve its main goal: a vote cancellation. Many criticize Mousavi and
76
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Karoubi for not taking advantage of human resources and the political opportunities
(cracks among elites, a relative openness before the elections) that were present during
the height of the turmoil. In response they tend to argue for a non-violent and peaceful
social movement, that does not repeat the mistakes of 1979 revolution, and limit the cost
of political activism to its lowest against the regime’s repression.
The emphasis on non-violent struggle to achieve movement’s goals on one hand,
and interaction between social movement networks to find innovative solutions to lower
the cost of activism, on the other hand has strengthen the dialogue and deliberation
among different movement adherents. In a post-religious, post-ideological, and post-class
social movement, framing the movement process and compromise building between
different social movement networks is a way to move the democratic discourse forward.
The election campaign of Mousavi and Karoubi were able to do so during the month
leading to the elections, but the known figures of the movement have come short to
establish viable plans and a coordinating force to take advantage of their resources. It is
true that different types of leadership emerge in different cultural and political contexts,
but in a non-violent and civil struggle such as the Green Movement where the speedy
revolutionary course of emotions after a while fades away, a degree of planning and
coordination among movements’ adherents and resource mobilization on the part of the
loose leadership is required in order to sustain the movement and take advantage of a
citizenry’s deliberation and potential for democratization.
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CHAPTER IV:
THE INTERACTION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES,
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND FRAMING PROCESSES
INTRODUCTION
In accounting for the emergence and form of a social movement, political
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes are constantly
interacting. This thesis analyzes four variables that reflect more on subjective and cultural
aspects of the movement, rather than the structure of the system. These independent
variables are: the availability of aggravated classes; the use of information
communication technologies; ideologies (in terms of perceived legitimacy or
illegitimacy); and leadership. This chapter establishes the interaction between these four
variables and the structure of political opportunities and resource mobilization. Here I
focus on four ‘consensual dimensions’ of political opportunity structures drawn by
McAdam from various authors.
This chapter first establishes the interaction between political opportunity
structures, resource mobilization, and framing processes in the emergence and form of
the Green Movement. I argue that we need to attribute a central role to the framing
processes in accounting for timing and form of the Green Movement during the height of
the protests. Political opportunity structures appear in terms of perceptions of openness
and instability of elite alignments, and not in terms of objective changes in the structure
of the political system. Political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures come
second in their interaction with framing processes and are mediators. Second, this chapter
builds on the implications of these findings for framing processes.
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Borrowing from the literature review, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) point
to a conviction and a consensus that most political movements and revolutions are set in
motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or
receptive to challenge. But these “political opportunities,” drawn from rational choice
theory, are but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient
organization—whether formal or informal—such opportunities are not likely to be
seized. Finally mediating between the structural requirements of opportunity and
organization are the emergent meanings and definitions, or frames, shared by the
adherents of the burgeoning movement. The impetus to action, thus, is as much a cultural
construction as it is a function of structural vulnerability. Such changes in the structure of
politics encourage mobilization not only through the “objective” effects they have on
power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further undermine the
legitimacy of the system. Expanding political opportunities then derive their causal force
from the interaction of those structural and perceptual changes they set in motion.
A similar reciprocal dynamic defines the relationship between organization and
framing processes. Framing processes clearly encourage mobilization as people seek to
organize and act on their growing awareness of system’s illegitimacy and vulnerability.
At the same time, the potential for the kind of system critical framing processes is
conditioned by the population’s access to various mobilizing structures. Also, framing
processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequences under
conditions of strong rather than weak organization. The absent of any real mobilizing
structure would almost prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to
afford a basis for collective action.
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Political opportunities in this study have been conceptualized in terms of changes
in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political
system. By mobilizing structure, this study refers to those collective vehicles, informal as
well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. In terms
of framing processes, the aim is “strategic framing,” that is conscious strategic efforts by
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that
legitimate and motivate collective action. Framing the ideas about right and wrong to
nourish the movement’s goals are examined in terms of finding appropriate resources for
mobilization as adherents weigh their options for taking action in the movement.
Various factors are involved in the emergence and form of a particular social
movement. The scope of this study does not allow for in-depth analysis of each of these
variables, nor is it possible to conduct in counterfactual analysis within a one case study
to account for variations in each of the variables in their multiple and complex
relationships with others. For example, more research questions will arise by
systematically studying each of political opportunity variables, economy, or the
organizational aspects of the movement. These questions will be discussed in Chapter
Five.
THE INTERACTION: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES,
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND FRAMING PROCESSES
FRAMING, ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
The Green Movement’s framing processes and organizational tactics directly
impacted one another. As the adherents framed the movement goals in terms of vote
cancellation and truth seeking aspirations, peaceful demonstrations were planned in
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demand of reform and civil rights among the ‘informal social movement networks,’
which address the organizational dimensions of the Green Movement. These processes
were brewing during the years leading to the summer of 2009 by way of everyday life
micro-mobilization; structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement
mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units,
friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of state structure
itself (McCarthy 1996, p.141). Among the main platforms for such micro-mobilization
among circles of individuals (friends, family, moderate elements of the regime) during
the years leading to the elections have been the Internet; the blogosphere, and the social
media.
These processes were shaping up among Internet users and bloggers as one space
for conversation. Attempting to map these structures in a society, McCarthy asserts that
at the least formally organized end of the map are “families” and “networks of friends”
(1996, p.142). It is upon these most basic structures of everyday life that much local
dissent is built. These structures are in line with McAdam’s widely adopted concept of
“micro-mobilization contexts” (1982) that suggests a wide variety of social sites within
people’s daily rounds where informal ties between people can serve as solidarity and
communication facilitating structures when and if they choose to go into dissent together.
When authoritarian regimes restrict access to ordinary forms of political
participation, citizens in those regimes are often forced to improvise new forms of
participation and occupy alternative spaces in order to do so. Asef Bayat (2010) refers to
such actions as “quiet encroachment,” and argues that they typify the experiences of
ordinary citizens across the Middle East. Quiet encroachment takes advantage of spaces
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that autocratic regimes cannot control or have not fully controlled. Within these spaces,
citizens establish a different public order that exists largely outside the state-dominated
sphere of formal politics.
Because the activities of quiet encroachment are neither centrally organized nor
state- or NGO-supported, Bayat refers to them as social “nonmovements” (59).
Nonmovements establish loose networks of familiarity and solidarity but they do not lead
directly to a politics of organized protest or struggle. Instead they are the result of
unorganized individual direct actions that aim at the “redistribution of social goods” and
the attainment of “autonomy, both cultural and political, from the regulations,
institutions, and discipline imposed by the state and modern institutions” (59).
We may view Bayat’s notion of “quiet encroachment” into spaces (actual and
virtual) in authoritarian states is a way for citizens to build loose networks that can be
activated and ‘turned political’ in certain circumstances. The Internet and the social
media are examples of such spaces in the Middle East where ‘informal networks’ of
friends and activists had been discussing and framing ideas about right or wrong that
undermines the systems’ legitimacy to rule.
The role of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in recent events
during the Arab Spring uprisings and earlier in the summer of 2009 in the aftermath of
elections in Iran, should be analyzed not only in terms of the ‘information,’ but the
‘access’ they provide for lay citizens to engage in conversation and exchanging ideas. For
example in Iran many journalists, women rights activists, communists, seculars, […] and
the diaspora turned to Internet to express their views during the years leading to 2009
uprisings, using the virtual world to bypass the state’s control in the real world. In closed
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authoritarian states with few freedoms of expression, the Internet and social media are
one of the main platforms for communication between circles of friends, and activists.
These loose networks of individuals and the “quiet encroachment” space the ICTs
provide, translate into the real world when a majority of citizens view their conditions as
relatively deprived vis-à-vis the status quo. In the case of the 2009 Green Movement in
Iran, citizens used ICTs as tools to disseminate information, debating movements’ frames
and strategies, and organizing around their cause. At the height of a social movement in
authoritarian systems of governance, ICTs, by connecting activists to other adherents, the
outside world, and the mainstream media, function as the main source of communication
and information dissemination. The Green Movement’s framework, strategies and
organization were mainly discussed on the web (the social media and the blogs), between
‘informal social networks,’ which provide many more people a voice. The Green
Movement was not dependent upon a central organization or website, did not follow any
specific ideology, rather it was dependent on every individual’s creativity and
deliberative agency that gave the movement its momentum.
More important than information dissemination, the focus in considering the role
of ICTs in states where citizens have limited access to formal civil society networks
should be ‘access.’ The Internet has changed the rules by taking part in the political
game. For example, analysis of Iran’s blogosphere during the years leading to the 2009
demonstrations reveals three interconnected issues. First, it leads us to the vast number of
voices and ideas that find a space to be heard. Second, it demonstrates the importance of
the free space that is provided for these individuals and organizations to express their
views. And third, the range of topics that they introduce into the public sphere is being
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revealed, thus surpassing the system’s censorship of many social issues and making
public of previously inarticulate and un-noticed social issues, such as gender relations, or
political discussions. Considering ICTs as another tool, taking up the role of radio,
television, and cassette tapes in the 1960s and 1970s, to disseminate information and
mobilize masses undermines the bottom-up space for conversation that they provide
during years prior to emergence of a social movement. The ‘informal social movement
networks’ with diverse participants, and de-centralized and non-hierarchical organization
were able to keep the Green Movement viable even after months of facing repression by
the Islamic Republic.
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
The four consensual dimensions of political opportunity structures offered by
McAdam (1996) are: first, the relative openness and closure of institutional political
system; second, the stability of elite alignments; third, the presence of elite allies; and
fourth, the state’s capacity for repression. One dimension of consensual political
opportunity is stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments. The Islamic
Republic of Iran has been divided between two main camps since its establishment in
1979. The leftist camp leans toward Khomeini’s ideals and social justice which today
constitute many reformists, and the rightists, which today constitute more hardliner
elements of the regime that are closer to the supreme leader, Khamenei. Mousavi and
Karoubi were both leaning toward leftist wings of the Islamic Republic during the early
years of the revolution. These ideological divisions among the so-called leaders of the
Green Movement and rightists, who were strongly backed by the Supreme Leader at the
time of the elections, have been constant since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
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There were not any alignment shifts within the system. Mousavi and Karoubi never
rejected the system’s fundamental values in their statements, both before the movement’s
emergence and after it took momentum.
There was not much instability in terms of structural changes of elite alignments
before the 2009 elections that could have impacted the emergence of the movement.
Rather, the voters tried to shift the elite alignments and the power structure by voting,
unlike the boycott of the elections in 2005. They framed their collective will around the
goal of pushing Ahmadinejad out of presidential office. The perceived logic in the
months leading to the elections was that by voting in massive numbers there would not be
any possibilities of vote rigging by the regime. They hoped for a landslide victory for one
of the candidates closer to the reformist camp, taking Khatami’s landslide victory in
previous elections as inspiration for their action.
In fact the supreme leader encouraged Iranians to go out and vote. Giving a degree
of freedoms to those closer to the reform camp to campaign and gather supporters
(specially the youth) was part of regime’s strategies to increase the voter turnout, and by
doing so to increase the legitimacy of the system. Official election results put the voter
turnout around 85 percent, with 63% of the electorate voting for Ahmadinejad.78 The
regime did not estimate that the situation could get out of control after the elections. On
one hand, the Islamic Republic implemented a strategy of stick and carrot; a degree of
openness before the election, massive security presence on the day of elections, and
repression from that moment afterward. On the part of the Green Movement adherents,
78
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this ‘perceptual’ openness re-enforced their shared identity to change the course of the
actions, aware of the Guardian Council’s control and structural closure of Islamic
Republic’s institutions.
The stick and carrot strategy, the high intensity of political activities during the
months leading to the elections, and strong attacks by both Mousavi and Karoubi on
Ahmadinejad policies, led to the perception that the system was becoming more open to
criticism. Supporters of presidential hopefuls perceived some degree of openness of the
system to freedom of expression and freedom of political activities. Despite the
surveillance of the Guardian Council,79 the voters tried to employ legitimate structures of
the system in their own advantage. The structural barriers to citizens’ access to
institutional power had not been changed in any objective way. Rather the movement
adherents decided to take advantage of minimal electoral opportunities. These
opportunities were constant and similar to the previous elections held by the Islamic
Republic. The difference must be sought in other factors to account for emergence and
form of the Green Movement.
From the four consensual dimensions of political opportunity structures
introduced by McAdam, the presence of elite allies has impacted the movement in
positive ways. Mousavi and Karoubi’s speeches and activities, before and during the
height of the movement, both influenced some to go out and vote, and had a positive
impact in the loose organizational framing of the Green Movement. However, we need to
account for the fact that both of these men were elements from within the regime and
have held several key posts in the Islamic Republic. Their candidacy was perceived as an
79
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opportunity to balance against the hardliner policies enforced by Ahmadinejad, both at
the national and international level. This leads to another dimension of the Green
Movement, its emphasis on non-revolutionary activities which might result in a speedy
regime change. Movement adherents still tried to change the course by participating in
elections, seeing capacities for reform and trying to take advantage of the minimal
structural opportunities offered to them; that is façade elections.
The degree of freedom that was protected by the regime during the election
campaigns was soon diminished by the military’s heavy presence on the streets on the
day of the elections, and by Internet and mobile telephone disruptions. The
demonstrations erupted simultaneously and repression can be seen on the streets of
Tehran on the very first day of the protests. Although Mousavi and Karoubi both
denounced the election results, they both joined the street protests a few days after
movement adherents remained in the streets. There is no official data on the number of
the demonstrators, although some sources put it at hundreds of thousands and the pictures
and videos shared on Youtube and other social media websites show a vast number of
people taking part. The demonstrations erupted on June 13, 2009, when the results were
announced one day after the elections were held. Mousavi and Karoubi showed up among
the demonstrators in the streets of Tehran on June 15th. Although both men denounced
the election results and vowed to not to give up on getting their votes back, there was no
guarantee that they would join the street protests since they were both insiders to the
Islamic Republic’s system.
Discussing the interrelationship between political opportunities, framing and the
mobilizing structures, McCarthy asserts that more stable elements of political opportunity
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are central in shaping the available range of mobilizing structures in the longer run. And,
more volatile elements of political opportunity are important in understanding the shorter
run choices among those available structures that activists make. The most stable element
of the political structure in the summer of 2009 in Iran was the willingness of the regime
to repress the protests from the day they emerged. Despite this massive repression the
movement adherents remained in the streets for several months. It is true that repression
blocked and to some degree shaped how movement adherents decided not to participate
in high-risk activities such as street protests after several months. But the non-violent
strategies of the movement, and its loose and de-centralized structure were first framed
both by the adherents and the well-known figures of the movement, and the adherents did
not engage in reciprocal violence. The impact of four consensual dimensions of political
opportunity structures on emergence and form of the Green Movement is summarized in
figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1.The Implications for Political Opportunity Structures
Political Opportunity Structures

Implication/Impact

Openness of the institutional system

Perceived

Instability of elite alignments

Perceived

Presence of elite allies

Positive

Repression

Negative *(in terms of movement’s
progression)

The emergence and form of a movement is dependent upon interplay of structural,
organizational, and framing variables. These variables include relative openness or
closure of the institutional system; stability or instability of elite alignments; the presence
or absence of elite allies; and the capacity of the system to repress; resources to
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mobilizing and organization (money, human capital, organizational tools, etc.); and
frames that give values and meaning to the collective action. These elements are
constantly interacting, only the degree to which they impact a given movement varies. In
the case of the Green Movement, framing processes were key both to the emergence and
form of the movement. This explains for the framework to avoid violence, calls for a
national referendum, demand for truth and civil rights, and de-centralized, and nonhierarchical aspects of its leadership and organization. Collective Values and meanings to
shape the strategic framing of the Green Movement were dependent upon individual
agency of each of the movement’s adherents and were not dictated by a charismatic
leader or a formal social movement organization (SMO). Rather its loose networks of
individual and circles of friends and families formed a collective frame to ask ‘where is
my vote?’
Among the four aspects of McAdam’s political opportunity structures, I argue that
the presence of elite allies and perceived openness of the system had had a positive
impact on the timing and form of the Green Movement. As discussed above, structural
variables are not strong indicators for the timing of the movement, but they are present.
In the case of the Green Movement framing processes had the central role. Structural
variables and organization only mediated between these collective framing processes.
They are necessary elements in order to account for success or failure of the movement,
but not sufficient to explain for its timing and form.
Political opportunities have impacted the Green Movement’s timing and form in
terms of ‘perceptual’ rather than ‘objective’ expansions of opportunities in the structure
of the system. The movement’s adherents framed and organized their activities with this
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perception. As McAdam notes the kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are
most defensibly conceived of as political opportunity should not be confused with the
collective processes by which these changes are interpreted and framed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FRAMING PROCESSES AND MOVEMENT’S SHORTTERM VIABILITY
THE CONTEXT
The Green Movement adherents only slightly try to frame the symbols and
activities based on massive repression and unresponsiveness of the Islamic republic
system to their demands. In spite of the repression, movement adherents remained
peacefully in the streets for several months. The 1979 revolution is the context within
which the 2009 Green Movement is framing its strategies and demands. A revolution that
according to many scholars was being hijacked by a minority of Islamist groups that
established an Islamic Republic state, in the course of the speedy regime change that
brought down the Pahlavi Dynasty. Movement adherents did not opt for such change this
time.
The 1999 student protests are another context. The moderate policies of
Khatami’s ‘reform government’ were being preferred in 2009 by the youth in comparison
to Ahmadinejad’s hardliner policies. The 1999 student protests cannot be considered as
indications for conditions of ‘failed reforms,’ in discussing the structural variables.
Rather as McAdam notes, movements tend to cluster in time and space because they are
not independent of each other. The framing of the Green Movement was influenced by
1999 protests to re-interpret their situations in light of the available master frame (a stolen
vote) and to mobilize based on the new understandings of themselves and the world
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around them. Thus, the presence of such a frame constitutes yet another cultural or
ideological resource that facilitates movement emergence. This aspect also reflects upon
what Zald (1996) calls the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical events in
providing opportunities for framing. The emphasis on Iranian identities rather than
Islamic one, also reflects on what he refers to as cultural construction of repertoires of
contention and frames (261).
Zald asserts that culture, ideology, and strategic framing are linked because they
are the topics that deal with the content and processes by which meaning is attached to
objects and actions. Culture he argues is the shared beliefs and understandings mediated
by and constituted by symbols and language of a group or society. In 2009, the Green
Movement tries to re-awaken the Iranian culture and identity. In this sense the color
green not only refers to Islamic values, but rather more than that it presents the re-birth of
the nature, spring; the Iranian new year and of that the beginning of a new political
culture.80 Movement adherents constantly tried to innovate frames and strategies that
build on this culture.
“COGNITIVE LIBERATION”
McAdam (2000), with the notion of “cognitive liberation,” has identified four
general types of “expanding cultural opportunities” that appear to increase the likelihood
of movement activity (p.254). These four are: first, the dramatization of a glaring
contradiction between a highly salient cultural value and conventional social practice.
Second, “suddenly imposed grievances.” This cognitive stimulus to framing processes
80
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describes those dramatic, highly publicized, and generally unexpected events—human
made disasters, court decisions, official violence—that increase public awareness and
opposition to previously accepted social conditions. Third, dramatization of a system’s
vulnerability or illegitimacy, this is another “cultural” or “cognitive opportunity” that
may stimulus increased framing or other forms of mobilization. Fourth, the availability of
what Snow and Benford (1988) term “master protest frames” within which subsequent
challengers can map their own grievances and demands. These expanding opportunities
are all cultural and cognitive.
As Tilly (2009) calls attention to cultural breaks and cultural contradictions that
lead to action and policy imperatives only as they are defined in an active process of
cultural and movement construction. Political and mobilization opportunities are often
created by cultural breaks and the surfacing of long dormant contradictions that reframe
grievances and injustice and reinforce the possibility of action. Cultural contradictions
occur and lead into mobilization when two or more cultural themes that are potentially
contradictory are brought into active contradiction by the force of events, or when the
realities of behavior are seen to be substantially different than the ideological
justifications for the movement.
The cultural and cognitive “suddenly imposed grievances” can politicize
individuals’ identities and give the impetus for collective action. As discussed in Chapter
Two, relative deprivation and social identity theories posit that movement adherents
should perceive inequality and illegitimacy of their conditions vis-a-vis the status quo in
order to engage in collective action. Further, they should perceive the status quo as
unstable and should be able to frame alternatives to it. The initial shock of “a stolen vote”
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politicized and produced a collective identity that imagined an alternative to its deprived
conditions. Adherents demanded this alternative in form of ‘vote recount’,‘authorization
for a peaceful demonstration’ and a ‘national referendum’, to be able to gather support
from those who were not willing to risk in face of the repression and in order to stay
within the non-violent framework of the Green Movement. Calls for a referendum came
mainly from the movement’s well-known figures; the two ‘turned-to-opposition’ figures,
Mousavi and Karoubi. As the Islamic Republic did not cede to demands of the protesters
and the lack of legitimacy of the system glared dramatically by repressing the protests,
the street slogans became more radical; chanting “death to the dictator,” or even at some
points “death to the Supreme Leader.” This, however, never was articulated by the
movements’ figures Mousavi and Karoubi, and nor was it agreed upon by movement
adherents.
Some have criticized this aspect as lack of unity and defined goals among the
demonstrators and the leaders. In contrast, I argue that the unwillingness on behalf of
Mousavi and Karoubi to denounce the position of the Supreme Leader impacted the
movement in two positive ways. First, Iran is a country with many believing in Islamic
values. By not rejecting the role of velayat-e faghih (“the rule of the jurist”) and not
signaling out the Islamic values, they were able to gather more people around
movement’s collective identity. The reference to the color green holds also symbolic
Islamic values. At the same time, they announced several times that the movement
encompasses all beliefs and identities and has not framed itself under any ideological
umbrella. Second, it enabled to frame the movement goals (both by so-called leaders and
movement adherents) under full implementation of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.
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By doing so, they could clearly ask for authorization for peaceful demonstrations and
vote recount, as well as full implementation of the law in any aspect. This would
establish a clear pathway for movement adherents and their demands.
After all, the demonstrations were born out of elections. The voters had perceived
a relative opportunity and openness to change the course of the actions and policies of the
government by taking part in elections. Reform within the constitutional laws, in other
words, must not have been out of order. Thus, taking part in elections indicates the
willingness of the movement’s adherents to act within the Islamic republic’s Constitution
as a starting point; hoping for a more moderate president that would reform the course
that Ahmadinejad had been taken in his internal and external policies. ‘A stolen vote’
also provided a “master frame” under which groups and individuals with different
ideologies could map their grievances and demands.
Demands for basic civil rights of free and fair elections indicate the non-violent
aspirations of Green Movement activists. The demonstrations could have turned more
violent if the movement adherents had decided to frame their strategies in respond to the
state violence. In contrast, they refused to take part in any activity that could result in
speedy and violent courses of interaction and perhaps change. Their demands came out
an election; that is the most civil and official way of expression of rights and wrongs and
choices possible within the Islamic Republic framework. The ‘silent demonstration’,
discussed in Chapter Two, is one good example of civil ways of claiming the ‘stolen
vote’. Other examples include demands for a referendum, not engaging in violence in
kind with the regime elements, and cancelling the demonstrations because of the high
risks of violence. Discussing the movement’s strategies and frames by the grassroots
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mainly on the Internet (the blogosphere and social media) also indicates deliberation and
agency on the part of movement adherents.
THE FRAMING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS
Green Movement activists, however, do not all hold the same ideology. Rather,
during the height of the elections they managed to organize and find common ground in
continuous interpretations of movements goals, strategies, and courses of action within
the movement and in interaction to the outside world. This reflects upon what Zirakzadeh
(1997) calls the “popular culture,” which posits that in society rich cultural currents are
being constantly developed by ordinary people in restaurants, cafes, streets, and the cyber
space where people speak about their sufferings and ways how to approach them. Despite
elite’s efforts to influence the thinking of non-elites, the latter repeatedly question the
elite’s definition of reality in the daily expressions of popular culture and within social
movements. This reflects upon truth-seeking aspect of the movement in the height of the
protests and during the election campaigns, emphasized by the ‘opposition figures’,
which further undermines the legitimacy of the system. The Green Movement’s survival
and success, however, depends on how it forms its “autonomous culture,” which holds
that the social movements themselves are climates and environments, in which new
subversive ideas are invented and nurtured.
Symbolic and strategic framing of the Green Movement was useful in initial
phases of the protests and for its short-term viability, but was not efficient for sustaining
the action mobilization. Rucht (1996) asserts that for large scale and sustained movement
activities mobilization requires resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames,
skills, and technological tools to process and distribute information and to influence
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people (p.186). By movement structure he refers to the organizational bases and
mechanisms serving to collect and use the movement’s resources.
The movement can realize its potential to be strong and successful to the extent it
takes this context into consideration and makes it resonant by structural attunement,
strategic calculation, and clever use of leverage points. This requires an identification and
“exploitation” of patterns that work in favor of the movement and the avoidance of that
which could weaken it. In the case of the Green Movement this “exploitation” did not
take place. Further questions about building on de-centralization and non-hierarchical
structures of the movement while strengthening the organizational structures needed to
connect the social movement networks in conditions of repression require more attention
for long-term viability of the movement. These questions and further questions regarding
the structural variables will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER V:
CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
This study investigated grassroots identities in contemporary Iran by process
tracing their use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) during the period
that triggered the emergence and form of the Green Movement. The role of movement
leadership was also investigated in order to determine which types of leadership styles
are most relevant to the Green Movement. Current theories of social movements posit
that agentic, structural, and mobilization variables continuously interact to account for
emergence and form of a particular social movement. Keeping the interaction constant,
this study mainly explored the agency in its interaction with other independent variables
in order to determine whether or not we could delegate the central role in emergence and
form of the Green Movement to the framing processes that give values to the goals and
strategies of the movement. In this concluding chapter, I provide a response to the
hypotheses suggested in Chapter One. Then, I discuss future implications for the study of
social movements in general, and the Green Movement in particular, as well as, the
research limitations.
ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES
HYPOTHESIS 1: Political opportunity structures are constantly impacted by mobilizing
structures and framing processes. In the case of the Green Movement emergence and
form, the central role should be given to the framing processes rather than the political
opportunity structures.
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Investigation of the socio-cultural structures and identities of the grassroots with a
focus on Internet users and bloggers indicates that the emergence and form of the Green
Movement in 2009 mainly borrows from the framing processes that shaped ideas about
right or wrong and had reduced the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy to the minimum level,
making it susceptible for a broad-based social movement to exploit it. These framing
processes that gave values and meanings to the movement adherents’ goals and strategies
were made possible through cognitive opportunities that had stimulus increased framing.
These expanding cultural and cognitive opportunities, such as the suddenly imposed
grievances, dramatization of a system’s vulnerability and legitimacy, and the availability
of master frames, gave the movement its impetus for action.
Among the structures of political opportunity, the presence of Mousavi and
Karoubi—the elite allies—had a positive impact on emergence and form of the Green
Movement. Other structural variables appear in terms of perceptual rather than objective
opportunities. There were not any changes in regards to institutional access or openness
into the structure of the system. Rather, perceptions about instability of elite alignments
and open access to the system, as well as a consensus to change the course of
Ahmadinejad’s policies encouraged movement adherents to take advantage of minimal
electoral opportunities. Framing processes are key to the emergence and form of the
Green Movement. Political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures only mediate
between these processes.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Grassroots identities and the use of Information Communication
Technologies have had a positive impact on the emergence and form of the 2009 Green
Movement.
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Movement adherents used ICTs to shape frames that gave values and meaning to
their actions both before and after the emergence of the Green Movement. Process tracing
the activities of the adherents on the Internet and the blogosphere supports hypothesis
two on the positive impact of ICTs in emergence and form of the Green Movement.
Within almost fifteen years of ICTs’ introduction into the country, they became one of
the main conversational platforms among different ideologies and adherents of Marxist,
liberal, leftist, women rights activists, unionists, and the Iranian diaspora who were not
able to operate freely in the real world. The role of ICTs and blogs in Iran today is
remarkable in terms of the vast number of voices that find a platform to be heard, the
space that is provided for these individuals to discuss their views freely, and the wide
range of topics and discussions that they introduce into the circles of friends and family
and into the public sphere.
The ICTs, and specifically the Internet, also provide a space to access
information, surpassing the censorship imposed by Tehran. At the height of the Green
Movement, ICTs, by connecting activists to other adherents, the diaspora, and the
mainstream media around the world, functioned as the platform for information
dissemination by the movement adherents and citizen-journalists. They were also used in
symbolic terms, taking advantage of the social media and Youtube as the main resource
under repression to discuss and enforce their collective identity.
Many of the demonstrations were planned via the Internet, and news with details
for gatherings disseminated via the Internet into the off-line world. After each
demonstration, the adherents used Youtube and social media to upload videos and photos
from the day, and to create symbolic images about the sacrifices in the streets. These
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videos and images in real-time arouse emotions—especially shock, fear, anger—which
drew more participants into the movement. The organizational role of the ICTs also
becomes clear as both the so-called leaders and movement adherents used the ICTs for
organizing and planning the next steps, as well as publishing their manifestations and the
Green Movement Charter on the web.
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the absence of a strong charismatic leadership within the Green
Movement, there have been limitations on the short-term success of this movement.
This diverse and broad-based participation had opened possibilities of leadership
to many more adherents, and had turned many social media websites and blogs into a
mode for interaction. The movement was not dependent upon any one blog, nor did the
adherents follow Mousavi or Karoubi’s every move. The opposition figures themselves
repeatedly announced that they are only one component of the movement. They appeared
to be pragmatic and orator types of leaders that tried to delegitimize the Islamic
Republic’s repression of the Green Movement by seeking to take advantage of Iran’s
Constitution through non-violent means. During the height of the elections, the Green
Movement enjoyed a networked-based leadership, from the election campaign to the
demonstrations it has proven to be a movement based on network of individuals and not a
hierarchical leadership.
The movement leadership is de-centralized. On one side are the reformist groups,
which because of three decades of cooperation and political activity are better
coordinated and act within a more organized framework. But, there are secularists,
leftists, religious, and groups with gender, ethnic, or tribal interests, trying to coordinate
their activities with their core movement and with others under the umbrella of the Green
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Movement. Furthermore, the movement leadership is based on compromises. The
activists of the Green Movement have shown that they can build compromises on their
minimum demand, despite the diversity of ideas and demands. The fact that people
decided to take part in the elections despite the surveillance of the Guardian Council and
despite the fact that Mousavi and Karoubi both insisted on their loyalty to Islamic
Republic’s system, shows that the activists can categorize and prioritize their demands
and take action based on that.81
Hypothesis Three suggests that without a charismatic leader, the movement has
not been successful. The analysis of the leadership style in the Green movement indicates
that there is actually a lack of charismatic leadership in the movement. This supports the
first half of the hypothesis. The movement has not been successful in achieving its initial
goals thus far. However, we cannot attribute its initial failure to a lack of a charismatic
leader. Perhaps the findings most relevant to this study are the many ways grassroots took
advantage of their identities and used ICTs as tools for information, conversation, and
organization, as well as, the network-based, de-centralized, and non-hierarchical nature of
the Green Movement. These are clear indications that charismatic leaders who might
advocate for a specific ideology are not welcomed among the adherents. Rather, there are
indications of civic agency, and a hope that the movement adherents are able to take
advantage of each individual’s creativity and responsibility to move the movement goals
and strategies forward when and if they decide to go into mass-protest again.
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THE THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Conventional theories of social movements suggest that ‘objective’ changes in the
structure of political opportunities shape framing processes that further undermine the
legitimacy of a system and thus triggering the emergence and form of a social movement.
The findings of this study drawn from the hypotheses, however, suggest otherwise. There
were not any objective openings and changes in terms of access to the institutions of the
Islamic Republic or shifts in the elite alignments in case of the Green Movement. Rather,
the ‘cognitive liberation’ occurring by relative deprivation of movement adherents vis a
vis the system and the social identities made and politicized by the initial shock of a
‘stolen vote’ triggered the emergence and shaped the form that the Green Movement took
later on.
Perhaps the findings that contribute most to testing and development of social
movement theories under authoritarian rule are the degrees of agency found among the
grassroots. The adherents were not just followers of a charismatic leader; rather, they
framed the movement’s goals and strategies and acted upon them. Identities of what Asef
Bayat (2010) calls ‘nonmovements’ were politicized and went into mass-protest by
taking advantage of their already existing informal social movement networks.
Nonmovements by themselves are unlikely to become an effective force for change,
however, unless “they become mobilized on a collective basis, their struggles linked to
broader social movements and civil society organizations” (Bayat, 65). Yet by creating a
space for individual agency and initiative, and for loose networks of visibility and
solidarity, social nonmovements can both promote active citizenship in the immediate
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domains of everyday life (249) and, under the right circumstances, support broad-scale
efforts to reform the state.
Revisiting table 1.1: The Political Process Dynamics Figure, from the literature
review and putting the framing processes at the center, I argue that the political
opportunity structures are necessary but not sufficient variables in accounting for
emergence and form of social movements under authoritarian and closed conditions (i.e.
the Arab Spring).
Figure 5.1. The Political Process Dynamics Figure
Structure of political
opportunity à

Strategic framing
ß à

Mobilizing structures
ß

Openness/closure of the
system

Ideologies/identities
(perceived legitimacy)

Leaders

Cracks among elites

Information Technologies

Grassroots/SMOs

Elite allies

Informal social movement
networks

Information Technologies

The degree of repression

Informal social movement
networks

International
pressure/Isolation
State’s centralization of
economic power
Failed reforms

Theories of social movements should move beyond the flaw of structure of political
opportunities that borrow their advantage mainly from the simplicity of rational choice
models. Rather the scholarship should examine closely the elements that draw upon
bounded cognitive abilities of movement adherents, which construct the opportunities,
goals, and strategies of a particular social movement. The framing processes and the way
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the adherents try to exploit the minimal ‘perceptual’ opportunities under closed systems
should be core when accounting for emergence and form of a social movement. The
focus then would be on how the political opportunity structures and mobilizing
mechanisms interact and are both impacted by and impact the core framing processes
when identities of ordinary citizens are politicized.
PROSPECTS FOR THE GREEN MOVEMENT
The Green Movement was framed by agency of hundreds of thousands of Iranians
who defined its goals and strategies in non-violent terms and under the umbrella of a
“stolen vote.” The movement adherents and activists were not consumers of a charismatic
figure’s words and efforts, rather were each contributors to the cause; from framing the
identities to determining the movement’s strategies.
Currently (as of February 2012), both Mousavi and Karoubi are under house
arrest. In their absence, the ‘coordinating council of the green path of hope’ (Shora-e
Hamahangi Rah-e Sabz-e Omid), which its members include some of Mousavi and
Karoubi’s advisors during the 2009 elections, publishes statements and invite the
adherents to take part in street demonstrations in occasions such as supporting the
uprisings of the Arab Spring. The ninth Majles elections will be held on March 2, 2012.
Mohammad Khatami, the former president and ‘the father of reform’ in Iran has
published three conditions to be met before the reformists would consider taking part in
the elections. These conditions are: freedom of all political prisoners, holding free and
fair elections, and full implementation of Iran’s Constitution.82 In a statement, the
‘coordinating council of the green path of hope,’ has also asked the reformists and the
82
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Green Movement adherents to boycott the upcoming elections since the conditions are
not favorable.83 Many well-known figures of the reform camp also boycotted the March
2012 Majles elections.
Whether the reformist camp is trying to re-generate its position as seeking reform
within the established current system, or as an opposition camp is not yet clear. In both
cases, these organizers and figures, alongside boycotting the elections and setting
conditions for participation, should draw strategies that target ‘micro-level’ organization
and framing processes among ordinary citizens. Putting the emphasis only on the
machinery of a regime’s source of legitimacy-seeking would not result in a sustained
social movement that may achieve its goals.
There is a difference between an organizing authority and a charismatic figure
that leads a social movement’s agenda according to his in-group ideology. These
organizers should take advantage of the potential for agency among Green Movement
adherents to strengthen the ‘informal social movement networks’ without trying to
anchor their diverse identities into an expert-type conversation that draws strategies for
the ‘followers.’ They should take advantage of the Internet not just for transferring
information about street demonstrations, but as a tool to foster conversation among
different backgrounds and ideologies in order to name, frame and make decisions about
current issues relevant to the movement, and identify resources, as well as organizing
across the diversity of the movement adherents to transfer the strategies to the off-line
world. Unless they do so, the movement will not achieve its potential to take advantage
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of each individual and their digital nodes when perceptions of structural vulnerability of
the system are high and thus motivations for participation arises.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
This study is based on process-tracing the movement leaders and adherents’
strategies and activities by using the information available on the Internet. Due to the
novelty of the movement and limitations in accessing official data, this study suffers from
shortcomings in data collection. I had to gather data mainly from the Internet and Iran’s
official ministry graphs that sometimes lack accuracy or are outdated. Researching the
ICTs, with their broad worldwide penetration and reach, risks reporting patterns and
interactions on the web that might seem relevant but might not be initiated by movement
adherents from inside Iran. For instance, in some cases it is hard to distinguish whether or
not some Facebook or Twitter messages are posted by activists from inside Iran or by the
Iranian diaspora residing outside of the country. Another limitation is the lack of access
to the opposition figures. Conducting interviews with Karoubi and Mousavi would have
made the conclusions of this study about the networked based, de-centralized, and nonhierarchical type of leadership and organization more clear.
This research is focused on the emergence and form of the Green movement after
the 2009 elections in Iran. A more systematic study of variables identified in this study to
examine their causal relationship with success and failure of the movement in achieving
its goals would be an illustrative next step. The framing processes were recognized
central to the timing and the form that the movement took during the height of the
elections. It is interesting to examine their impact on success or failure of such broad-
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based social movement and their interaction with political opportunity structures and
resource mobilization. This would provide grounds both for theory testing, as well as
directions for activists to build upon most relevant aspects to success of social
movements.
The scope of this study also did not allow for in depth analysis of each element of
the political opportunity structures in their interaction to other variables. Capacities of
Iranian grassroots and the middle-class and the values and meanings that they collectively
gave to Green Movement have most impacted the emergence and form of the movement.
But these framing processes were constantly impacted by structural variables. The most
stable element of political opportunity that took the momentum of the movement was the
degree of repression. It is useful to conduct a study on organizational variables that can
impact the success of a particular movement when facing a harsh degree of power and
repression. As the Green Movement adherents framed their strategies around a nonviolent framework, it would be of interest to investigate these strategies and structural
and organizational variables that have impacted the movement failure in achieving its
initial goals so far. This would identify the shortcomings as well as some new strategies
to keep the momentum of the movement.
Other structural variables such as the state of the economy at the time of the
movement are interesting to investigate. Are economic hardships sufficient to explain the
emergence and timing of a broad-based social movement? Is an oil producing economy
less susceptible to challenge by opposition activists? Or does it have more capabilities
and options to repress? Does oil production create authoritarian governments that provide
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services to citizens in exchange for their consent? What are the prospects for
democratization in major oil-producing countries in the Middle East?
Questions about regime transitions or democratization more specifically are
interesting subjects for research. As Bayat (2010) notes, as a result of the authoritarian
and closed nature of most states in the Middle East, along with the inward-focused nature
of existing civic organizations in the area, the best hope for democratic reform in Middle
Eastern countries is not civic organizations or NGOs but the quiet encroachment of social
nonmovements. The fact that the 2009 demonstrations came out of elections, and were
broadly organized by loose networks of individuals among family and friends, raises
questions and hope about aspirations of Iranians for equality, freedom, and selfdetermination and finally democratization.
The movement adherents had decided to take advantage of minimal democratic
mechanisms and called for a national referendum as the legitimacy of the Islamic
Republic eroded with its un-responsiveness to demands for vote cancellation. The “quiet
enchantment” spaces are already created in Iran and most Middle Eastern countries; it is
interesting to further investigate the relationship of the opportunities they provide for
agency and deliberation among the grassroots and their impact on the path towards
democratization. Questions also arise about which type of change along the social
movements’ spectrum—from revolutionary to gradual nonviolent reforms—would more
than others brighten the prospects for democratization or political liberalization
throughout the Middle East.
The findings and analyses of this thesis provide empirical evidence for
scholarship on flourishing of informal social ties among citizens facing up to
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authoritarian governments (specifically in the Middle East) and their positive uses of
ICTs in order to organize and disseminate information. As John Dewey puts it, the
democratic process at the individual level,
consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and
directing the activities of the groups in which one belongs and in participating
according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of
the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in
harmony with the interests and goods which are common (Dewey, 1988, p.327-8).
The scholarship on social movements should pay more attention to the bottom-up
framing processes that render a state’s power vulnerable, rather than only structural
variables that might have only slightly changed when a social movement erupts.
Reducing citizens’ role in these countries to voters and protesters who only support the
machinery of democracy without paying attention to its civic responsibilities is
misleading. The case of the Green Movement indicates that adherents are able to face up
to the authoritarian rule; unite over a ‘common good’ and make compromises despite
their differences. The ‘polycentrism’ surrounding the movement indicates civic agency
and responsibility on the part of the adherents with several decision-making and activity
nodes.
In many authoritarian states, the Internet and especially the blogosphere may be
the only ‘public sphere’ where citizens can interact and share censored information. One
focus of the scholarship should be investigating strategies that enable the activists to use
the ICTs as tools to foster sustained conversation free of exclusion. In this study of civic
agency facing up to authoritarian power, it is interesting to investigate the potential of
ICTs to be used as tools that build upon associations of individuals for discussion,
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consultation, persuasion and debate in decision-making and organizing among each of the
centers of activity and the adherents of social movements.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:
LIST OF FARSI WEBSITES AND BLOGS
WEBSITES
Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies website:
http://www.ict.gov.ir/home-en.html
The Islamic Iranian alumni organization website : http://advarnews.biz/
Kaleme : www.kaleme.com
Rahe Sabz : www.rahesabz.net
Jmhourikhahi : www.jomhourikhahi.com
Balatarin : www.balatarin.com
Rooz Online : www.roozonline.com
BBC Persian : www.bbcpersian.com
VOA News : http://www.voanews.com/persian/news/
DW- Persian : http://www.dw-world.de/dw/0,,641,00.html
Radio Farda : www.radiofarda.com
BLOGS
Green Revolution : http://greenrevolutioniran.blogspot.com/
Az Sarzamin-e past : http://fromnederland.blogspot.com/
Tahavol-e Sabz : http://tahavolesabz.com/
Green Correspondants : http://www.greencorrespondents.com/
Iran Green Voice : http://irangreenvoice.com/
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APPENDIX B:
IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS AND VOTER TURNOUT
The information section of Iran’s Interior Ministry announced the results of the 10th
Presidential Elections as follows:
Total of the votes: 39165191, Turnout: close to 85 percent
1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 24527516 votes, close to 62.63 percent
2. Mir-Hossein Mousavi with 13216411votes, close to 33.75 percent
3. Mohsen Rezaii with 678240 votes, close to 1.73 percent
4. Mehdi Karoubi with 333635 votes, close to 0.85 percent
Null votes: 409389, close to 04.1 percent of the total.

Source: Islamic Republic of Iran’s official interior ministry website. Retrieved from:

http://moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=832a711b-95fe4505-8aa3-38f5e17309c9&LayoutID=dd8faff4-f71b-4c65-9aefa1b6d0160be3&ID=5e30ab89-e376-434b-813f-8c22255158e1
Translation by the author.
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APPENDIX C:
CHART OF IRAN’S POWER STRUCTURE

Source: BBC World News website. Retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/
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